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REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY: STATE PROCEDURAL RULES
AND 1·8~ LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

Seymour Moskowitz*
In the modern era of few trials, the pretrial process is critical to
the disposition of most cases. Discovery has been a fiercely debated
subject for may years~ Many c()mmentators believe that discovery
has become too expensive, very time consuming, and often abusive.
Others disagree, and articulate an entirely different diagnosis of the
problems in our civil justice system. Regardless, the scope of discovery, and the process for undertaking it, create predictable advan·
tages and disadvantages_for many types of litigants. Although state
courts dispose of the vast majority of cases in the United States,
academic writings on procedural matters, particularly discovery, often overlook this area. This Article focuses on the state court aspects
of discovery and examines the discovery rules in state courts. The
Author identifies dramatic changes taking place in these courts. The
Author summarizes major trends in state rules, and discusses
changes and experiments in four states Texas, Arizona, Illinois
and Colorado in detail. The Article alsa analyzes whether changes
in discoue-ry are likely to create even further increases in the growing
numbers of summary judgments granted, and whether voluntary
sharing of information is likely to be successful in our adversary
litigation system.
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INTRODUCTION

The courts are an integral part of American society. Millions of
individual Americans and businesses rely upon the civil justice system to resolve issues personal injuries, family law matters, commercial disputes that are of immense importance in their lives. In
1999, nearly ninety-one and a half million new cases were filed in
1
state courts, together with more than two million in the federal
2
courts. In addition to private cases, courts are a frequent venue for
issues in th.e public square. De Tocqueville noted in the 1840s that
law, lawyers and the legal system are central ingredients in our
American democracy: ''Scarcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
3
question." Major public policy issues are routinely decided within the
context of civil litigation in the United States. Brown v. Board of
4
Education, .and its progeny, is a classic example. More recent battles
have included litigation, primarily in the state courts, about the liability of tobacco c-ompanies to smokers and states to cover costs for

1. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 19992000, at 10 (2000) (examining trends in federal and state caseloads), available at
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/divisions/research/csp/csp-statOl.html (last visited May 25,
2002).
2. ld.
3. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Henry Reeve ed.,
Vintage Books 1945) (1795).
4. 347 l[_Jr.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools are unconstitutional).
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smoking related illnesses, asbestos manufacturers, cases attempting to ameliorate degradation of the environment, as well as numer7
ous other decisions impacting entire industries.
Litigation in the United States has yet another important political or societal dimension. At least since the time of Andrew Jackson,
persistent s~pticism about the ability of public officials to protect
the interests of ordinary citizens from either their government or
from damage at the hands of those with wealth and economic power
has been expressed. As Jackson acknowledged, "[i]t is to be regretted
that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to
their selfish purposes .. ., . There are no necessary evils in govern8
ment. Its evils exist only in its abuses."
Procedure matters in litigation. As.Leonard Levy has noted, "the
history of both liberty and constitutional government is in large part
9
the history of procedure." Moreover, procedural rules allocate power
between litigants and thus affect substantive results. Although first
year law students in civil procedure courses across the United States
study the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules") in
depth, this is often the extent of serious study of civil procedure in
American legal education. Once in practice, however, these lawyers
See, e.g., CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: How
THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998).
6. See, e.g., Acands, Inc. v. Abate, 710 A.2d 944 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (relating to products liability actions brought by workers who were harmed by exposure to
asbestos against manufacturers and distributors/installers of asbestos-containing
products).
7. See, e.g., Vander Bloemen v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., No. 95-1761). 1996 WL
346266, at *2 (Wise. Ct. App. June 26, 1996) (holding that the public trust doctrine applies to the protection of lakeside ecology); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho ex rel.
Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995) (holding the public trust doctrine conferred
standing to an environmental group to challenge a timber sale on state forest lands
because sediment from the logging would harm fish spawning grounds and the bed of
an appurtenant creek); State v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (suit by the
Department of Environmental Protection against corporations and individuals based
on mercury pollution of state waterway); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426
N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981) (deciding a nuisance action to enjoin operator of chemical waste
disposal site from continued operation); Clark Curriden, Power of 12: Jurors Increasingly are Sending Loud Messages of Censure with Megabuck Verdicts. But Critics
Charge That a Jury is the Least Qualified Body to Decide Public Policy, 87 ABA J.,
Aug.-Sept. 2001, at 36 (cataloging and describing litigation involving HMOs, Fenphert, Tylenol, and other drugs, children's pajamas, and numerous other cases forcing
businesses and government to change the way they operate).
8. Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto Message to the Senate (July 10, 1832), reprinted in
2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 590 (James
D. Richardson ed., 1897).
9. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFfH AMENDMENT ix (1968); see also Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (noting that even though "in form the Great Writ is
simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of
fundamental rights of personal liberty").
5.
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quickly recognize the significance of state procedural rules~ The vast
majority of legal matters in the United States concern state law and
the vast majority of these matters entering the court system are filed
1
in state venues. ° Civil filings in state courts of general jurisdiction
increased by thirty-two percent between 1984 and 1999. 11 In the federal courts, new cases filed actually decreased in the same time period.12
In the modern era, ~he pretrial process is critical to the dis_position of most cases. The vast majority of cases never go to trial. Seventy-five percent of tort cases in state courts, for example, are dis13
posed of through settlement or voluntary dismissal. Those which
are contested at trial and upon appeal are often decided upon the results of the information gathering conducted before trial. This is true
in both private litigation and in public interest cases where "private
attorneys-general" may only function effectively with court-enforced
14
discovery.
The core function of discovery is to seek the truth so disputes
may be settled by what the facts reveal rather than what facts are
15
concealed. Legal disputes should be resolved on a level playing field.
This Article examines the state of state court pretrial discovery.
Although in the past state procedure was often patterned after the
Federal Rules many state rules have now escaped the gravitational
pull of the federal rules. Some now utilize different discovery procedures in different types of cases, a departure from the "trans16
substantive~' nature of the federal rules. Mandatory disclosure is a
10. The number of state cases dwarfs the federal caseload. While approximately
91.5 million cases were filed in state courts in 1999, only 2.1 million cases were filed in
the federal courts in that year. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 14.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Roselyn Bonanti, Tort ~eform' in the States, T:a.IAL, Aug. 2000, at 28; see also
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Public Policy Report, A Rising Tide of Torts, 71 N.Y. STATE BAR
J., Apr. 1999, at 41. In New York, only 3.5 percent of all tort cases filed went to trial.
I d.
14. At the federal level, Patrick Higginbotham has observed the following:
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys..general as an
enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights, and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these suits
must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is
calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.
Patrick Higginbotham, Foreward, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997).
15. See, e~g., Computer Teaching Corp. v. Courseware Applications, Inc., 556
N.E.2d. 816, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that "(d]is'covery is to be a mechanism for
the ascertainment of truth" and for creating conditions for a fair trial or a fair settlement).
16. William W. Schwarzer; In Defense of "Automatic Disclosure in Discovery," 27
GA. L. REV. 655, 657 (1993) (rebutting previous opposition to the provisions of Rule 26
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central pretrial concept in many jurisdictions, with requirements far
17
beyond those mandated in federal courts. A significant number limit
the traditional discovery tools depositions, interrogatories, requests
18
for production of documents, etc. in important ways. Some states
now explicitly require judges to "manage" the pretrial process, and
19
mandate or encourage the use of court drafted "standard discovery"
in lieu of party. .controlled inforn1ation gathering.
In the treatise portions of Matthew Bender's Forms of Discovery Volumes 11 to 14 I annually update a detailed analysis of all
20
fifty state rules of discovery. This Article does not duplicate the
mass of information presented in the treatise analyzing developments in all fifty states. Rather, this Article sets out general trends
and highlights specific state initiatives that offer fresh perspectives
on pretrial gathering of information in the civil justice system.
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of the development
of pretrial discovery and its significance in modern litigation. In
Parts III and IV, I discuss the controversy which surrounds discovery
practice in civil cases and changes in state procedure rules which
were initiated in the past decade. Part V presents an overview of
general trends in state discovery rules together with vignettes of four
specific states Texas, Arizona, Illinois and Colorado. These states
are engaged in a variety of procedural experiments attempting to
make civil litigation cheaper, faster and more efficient. Part VI looks
at the interplay between dispositive pretrial motions, particularly
summary judgment, and discovery rights. Part VII discusses whether
changes in rules and judicial exhortations to share information between parties can be expected to change contemporary pretrial practice and, if not, why not.

II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PRETRIAL INFORMATION GATHERING

"Mutual knowledge of all of the relevant facts gathered by both

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
17. See discussion infra notes 362-82 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
19. See discussion infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
20. The rules are summarized in charts or presented in full text and are annually
compared to the comparable federal discovery rules. See 11 BENDER'S FORMS OF DISCOVERY app. B (2001) (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 Through 33) [hereinafter BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS]; id. at app. C (State
Rules Governing Discovery at Variance with the Federal Rules); 12 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS app. E (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34); id. at app. F (State Rules at Variance with Federal Rule 34); 13 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS app. H (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 and 36); id. at app. I (State Rules at Variance with Federal Rules 35 and 36);
14 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS app. K (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 37 and 45).
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21

parties is essential to proper litigation. "

Generations of American lawyers have now been educated and
practiced law under modern discovery concepts and rules. Pretrial
information gathering under party control has become an integral
part of our legal culture. Disputes mus~ be decided by courts on the
facts and the law, after an opportunity for each side to inform itself
and its opponent of its version of fact and law. Professor Geoffrey
Hazard has expressed the view that such a right has a "virtually con22
stitutional foundation" in modern American litigation. Professor
Hazard's point, perhaps expressed hyperbolically, is correct. The
American civil justice system could not function without opportunity
for each side to gather information to present to each other and to a
court, if necessary. Indeed, although the vast majority of cases filed
23
in the United States never go to trial, discovery is an essential part
of the process by which parties negotiate their own resolution of the
dispute, and upon which courts dispose of cases by dispositive pretrial motions. Without the information gathering devices that civil
procedure rules provide, neither side could effectively evaluate the
24
strength of its own or its opponent's position. Moreover, if the parties were not gathering potential evidence, the huge caseloads in
25
American civil courts could scarcely be managed by the courts.
Pretrial information gathering is critical, not only to individual
cases, but also to the political role litigation plays in the United
.

.

21. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
22. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1665,
1694 (1998).
23. Jury trials accounted for only 2% of the 762,000 tort, contract and real property
cases disposed by state courts of general jurisdiction in the seventy-five largest counties in the U.S. in 1992. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CML
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES 1 (1995), available at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/cb658.pdf (last visited May 25, 2002); see also N .Y.State Bar Ass'n, supra note 13, at 40 (reporting that of
88,781 tort suits disposed of in the New York trial courts in 1996, only 3,088, or 3.5%,
ended in a jury verdict or a judge's decision, indicating they went to trial); Susan K.
Gauvey, ASR's Integration in the Federal Court System, MD. B. J., Mar-Apr. 2001, at
37 (noting that "the vast majority of cases do not go to trial and have never gone to
trial").
24. Depositions, for example, may often be a means of conveying the strength of a
party's case to the opponents so that a more realistic appraisal of the probability of
suc~ess may occur. See James W. McElhaney, Should You Hide the Flag? It Can Pay to
Reveal Case Strengths During Depositions, 84 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 74 (counseling
that it may pay to reveal case strengths during a deposition because this is the only
occasion when witnesses will ordinarily testify and it pays to make it clear how strong
they can be).
25. See In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
("The whole system of Civil adjudication would be ground to a virtual halt if the courts
were forced to intervene in even a :modest percentage of discovery transactions.").
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States. Dean Carrington has noted that discovery is the American alternative to a bureaucratic state: "The superiority of private litigation over the administrative process was recognized in the years fol26
lowing 1938, when modern discovery was introduced.'' Progressively, civil procedure has become the instrument for creating public
reforms and for challenging existing institutional practices. As Mirjan Damaska notes, "the objectives of civil litigation became complex
and multiple . . . . Effective tools of partisan investigation were developed with an eye toward litigation as an instrument of 'public policy[ ]' ...."27
But this access to pretrial information has not always been
available. The English common law system was characterized by
rigid, writ-dominated pleadings, limited parties, and single-issue
cases. These limitations undergirded a process structurally antithetical to information gathering tools. On the other hand, the practices in
equity courts provided the basis for modern discovery devices. In "legal" cases, the investigating party generally had to identify specific
28
materials as to which discovery was sought. Even under "Field"
Codes in American states, a plaintiff could not even begin discovery
unless he or she could independently substantiate "facts" stated in a
29
complaint. There was little opportunity to examine documents that
might be relevant and useful, use depositions, interrogatories, or
other tools of information gathering-3° to facilitate the proof of an ex31
isting or new theory of the case. In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court
denounced as a "fishing bill" any effort by a party to "pry into the
32
case of his adversary to learn its strength or weakness." An example
of this same attitude in the state courts is found in a Massachusetts
Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997).
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 133 (1986).
28. See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26, app. 100 (3d
ed. 2001) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE] (describing discovery procedures
at common law).
29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241 (1989) ("Unde.r the
codes, a plaintiff could not even begin discovery, unless he or she could independently
substantiate such suspicions, for substantiation had to be manifested in a complaint
that stated facts."). In his 1928 work on code pleadings, Professor Clark described
twenty-eight states as having adopted the Field Code; none of the remaining jurisdictions still adhered completely to common law pleading. CHARLES CLARK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928).
30. See generally GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) (describing discovery devices and procedures used in various American jurisdictions in 1932).
31. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill.
1979) ("[T]he heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business documents. Without them, there is virtually no case." (citation omitted)).
32. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
26.
27.
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33

case where the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied a litigants petition for discovery, reasoning the following:
It seems that the real purpose of taking the deposition is merely to
fish out in advance what the testimony will be . . . . This is what
Lord Hardwicke termed a "fishing bill," to enable the plaintiff to
learn whether he may sue his judgment against Kingsbury, and
levy on the land, with prospect of success ...As a bill of discovery
34
only, we think it cannot be maintained.

The adoption of the Federal Rules marked a new approach and
epoch. Charles Clark, former President of the Association of American Law Schools, and the drafter of the Federal Rules was fond of
quoting Frankfurter: "New winds are blowing on old doctrines. The
35
critical spirit infiltrates traditional formulas ...." The Federal
36
37
Rules simplified pleading, liberalized joinder of parties and claims,
and emphasized ease of litigation rather than technical legal pleading. In the seminal case of Conley v. Gibson, 38 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Federal Rule 8 only required a plaintiff to give fair notice to the defendant by way of a "short and plain statement of the
39
claim." The different phases of the pretrial process were mutually
reinforcing. Another major theoretical and practical feature of the
1938 procedural revolution was elimination of differing pleading requirements for different types of cases. Professor Clark insisted that
the concepts of uniformity and simplicity and the decision to merge
40
law and equity required the same rules for all cases. State procedure rules soon followed the federal model as a majority of the states
41
adopted the main features of the new federal procedure.
33. Fiske v. Slack, 38 Mass. 361 (1838), available at 1838 WL 2792.
34. Id. at 4-5; see also In re Abeles, 12 Kan. 451, 453 (1874); In re Cubberly, 18 P.
173, 173 (Kan. 1888) ("'The taking of the deposition of a party in a pending case,
merely to fish out in advance what his testimony will be, and to annoy and oppress
him, and not for the purpose of using the same as evidence, is an abuse of judicial authority and process ....'").
35. Charles Clark, What Now?, Address of the President of the Association of
American Law Schools at the 31'' Annual Meeting (Dec. 28-30, 1933) (quoting Felix
Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931)),
reprinted in 20 A.B.A. J. 431-35 (1934).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14, 18-24; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com·
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 982-91 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law].
38. 354 u.s. 41 (1957).
39. Id. at 47; see also Taylor, 329 U.S. at 501 ("The new rules, however, restrict
pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial").
40. Advisory Comm. Transcript (Nov. 14, 1935), quoted in Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law, supra note 37, at 977 n.393.
41. See 11-14 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS, supra note 20, at apps. B, C, E, F, H, I
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Most scholars give the credit for the innovative discovery concepts embodied in the Federal Rules to Professor Edson R. Sunderland.42 A scholar much engaged in the real world, he had consistently
43
advocated expanding discovery techniques. Professor Subrin notes
that the initial draft of the Federal Rules distributed for public comment "included every type of discovery that was known in the United
44
States and probably England up to that point." Sunderland's draft
went beyond the rules of any particular jurisdiction:
If one adds up all of the types of discovery permitted in individual
state courts, one finds some precursors to what later became discovery under the Federal Rules; but ... no one state allowed the total panoply of devices. Moreover, the Federal Rules, as they became
law in 1938, eliminated features of discovery that in some states
45
had curtailed the scope of discovery and the breadth of its use.

Responding to the spirit of the new rules, the Supreme Court wrote
in 1946: "No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition"
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
46
by both parties is essential to proper litigation."
The original Federal Rules, however, had significant limits upon
discovery. Examination and production of documents, for example,
were only available if ordered by the judge. "[l]nspections [of documents] had always been strictly regulated by the court and the po47
tential for invasion of files had always been feared." "Good cause"
was required to allow production of documents under the original
48
Rule 34. Over time, these restraints on access to documents were
& K (providing charts analyzing, collating, and setting out state discovery rules); see
also John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coons, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367; 1377-78 (1986) (describing major trends in the states toward adoption of Federal Rules, albeit with
changes).
42. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698-701 (1998)
[hereinafter Subrin, Historical Background].
43. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42
YALE L.J. 863, 872-73 (1933) (describing the benefits of "unrestricted mutual discovery.").
44. Subrin, Historical Background, supra note 42, at 718.
45. ld. at 719.
46. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 507; see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery together with the fair trial procedures make trial
less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest).
4 7. WILLIAM GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 33 ( 1968).
48.

AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 74-75 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) ("Upon motion of any party showing
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gradually limited. In 1970, the requirement for prior judicial approval for document discovery was removed entirely in the federal
49
courts.
Other changes similarly liberalized discovery. In 1946, the Federal Rules were amended to make clear that even inadmissible material was discoverable so long as it was "reasonably calculated to lead
50
to the discovery of admissible evidence." In 1948 a number of reforms were instituted. The req.u irement of leave of court for taking
1
depositions was eliminated. 5 Arbitrary limits on the number or scope
52
of interrogatories were eliminated; the standard for document production and inspection was eased from documents "material" to the
53
case to documents "related" to the case. In 1970, insurance policies
were explicitly made discoverable 54 and the motion to compel was
widened to apply to all discovery devices except mental and physical
55
exams under Rule 35.
In general, state procedure rules followed the federal developments. In 1935, Judge Clark and Professor Moore had expressed the
hope that the federal rules might "properly be a model to all the
56
states." Arizona was the first state in the nation to change .its rules
57
of civil procedure to follow the newly adopted Federal Rules. Norman Hull, a Phoenix lawyer, argued in favor of Arizona's adoption of
the federal rules because they were well-reasoned and desirable, and
because "lawyers practicing before the state .courts would be governed by the same rules and, when practicing before any federal
court in the United States they could walk into the courtroom and
58
feel at home." Although states accommodated to wider discovery at
different times, a current survey of fifty state -procedure rules shows
good cause therefore and upon notice to all other parties, the court ... may ... order
any party to produce ... documents . .. which constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action . ... " (emphasis added)).
49. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].
50. This language is now found at the end of FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l).
51. Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D.
433, 453 (1946).
.
52. I d. at 461.
53. Id. at 463.
54. Proposed Amendments, supra note 49, at 487.
55. See id. at 488. The proposal states that Rule 35 was excluded in this expansion
for two reasons: only a small percentage of exams needed motions, and, more significantly, the concern for "the interest of the person to be examined in the privacy of his
person." I d.
56. Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44
YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935).
57. Oakley & Coons, supra note 41, at 1381.
58. Lyle Roger Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1954).
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all have incorporated the discovery devices depositions, interrogatories, etc. codified in the federal rules, sometimes modified to meet
59
specific state procedure. Substantial differences in discovery between federal and state rules do, however, exist and these variations
•
•
are 1ncreas1ng.
An opportunity to engage in meaningful pretrial information
60
gathering is the counterpart to notice pleading and an essential
element in a just dispute resolution system. Liberal discovery is essential to pursue factual support for claims and defenses pleaded in a
61
nonspecific manner. Almost all states have replaced fact or code
62
pleading with a "short and plain statement of the claim" by the
plaintiff or another party. The Supreme Court noted in Conley that
"[s]uch simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established
by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and de63
fense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."
Improved discovery is defended on the basis that it cre-a tes better
access to courts and facilitates greater social justice. Cases are no
longer decided on "sporting" rules that allow surprise evidence- and
64
hidden traps for the unwary or misled. Just results are more likely
if both sides have access to information relating to their opponent's
65
contentions. The long struggle regarding the liability of the tobacco
companies for damages caused to smokers, their public and private
insurers, and the public would have been inconceivable without ac-

59. See 11-14 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS, supra note 20, at apps. B, C, E, F, H, I
& K (providing charts of state discovery rules in the treatise portions).
60. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 507-08 (distinguishing the discovery process, which
provides information for trial, from pleadings, which merely give notice). The term
"notice pleading" may well be inaccurate because in actual court practice complaints
(and counterclaims) must give "'fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."' 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
472-73 (5th ed. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
61. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 (describing how pretrial
information gathering and issue defining are critical to the structure of modern litigation and these rest upon appropriate discovery methods).
62. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 8; ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 8; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 8; COLO. R.
CIV. P. 8; DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 8; DEL. C.P. CT. CIV. R. 8; HAW. R. CIV. P. 8; IDAHO
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(l); IND. TRIAL R. 8; IOWA R. CIV. P. 70(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-208 (a)
(1999); KY. R. CIV. P. 8/01; ME. R. Crv. P. 8; MAss. R. Crv. P. 8; MINN. DIST. CT. GEN.
R. 8.01; MISS. R. CIV. P. 8; MONT. R. CIV. P. 8(a); NEV. R. CIV. P. 8; N.D. R. CIV. P. 8;
OHIO R. CIV. P. 8; R.I. R. CIV. P. 8; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 15-6-S(b); TENN. CIV. P.R. 8;

R.
CIV. P. 8.

UTAH.

CIV.

P. 8; VT.

R~ CIV.

P. 8;

WASH. CIV.

P. R. 8; W.

VA.

R.

CIV.

P. 8;

WYO

R.

63. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48.
64. See, e.g., Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 37, at 945.
65. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001,
at 39-41 (2d ed. 1994); see also Herbert v. Lando; 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
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cess to information possessed mainly by the industry. One aspect of
the case for comprehensive information sharing is thus based on the
need to formulate and prove claims on behalf of previously unknowing and damaged individuals. The production of documents and/or
electronically stored information is typically a plaintiffs best means
of obtaining evidence to prove a case t4at would be otherwise unproveable or to transform merely compensatory damages into a punitive award. Professor Green describes plaintiffs' attorneys in p'r oduct
liability cases, for example, relying on "civil discovery . . . [as] their
best hope of obtaining information that would reveal whether their
clients had meritorious claims and, if so, provide the evidence to en66
able their clients to prevail." Equity-derived liberal access to information allows equity-derived remedies, developed for this purpose in
67
institutional reform cases.
Some have even argued that developments in substantive law
areas such as products liability and consumer protection have been
68
the result, at least partly, of broad ranging discovery rights. The
Supreme Court has occasionally invoked the existence of broad discovery as pertinent to its handling of substantive issues of·employment discrimination law. In holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate
that challenged employment practices actually caused racial imbal69
ances in the work place, it rejected arguments that this was unfair
by pointing to discovery. The Court contended that "[s]ome will complain that this specific causation requirement is unduly burdensome
on Title VII plaintiffs. But liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs
broad access to employers' records in an effort to document their
70
claims."
Similarly, when the Court placed the burden
of
rebutting
an
em.
ployer's non-discriminatory justification on employees, it observed
that its ruling would not "unduly hinder the plaintiff' because of "the
•

66. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
MAsS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 15 (1996).
67. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (describing "structural reform" litigation and judges, particularly federal judges, who use historic equity powers
to expand rights).
68. Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981).
69. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1989). In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994), Congress arguably codified
this feature of Wards Cove, but there is debate on the impact of the statutory provi•

SIOD.

70. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court added that employers are required to
maintain records that would provide the sort of information needed to prove causation.
Id. at 657-58.

2002]

REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY

607
71

liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court."
Thus, the very structure of employment discrimination statutes as
interpreted by the Court has, at times, been founded on the availability of broad discovery.
Since 1970, the tide has changed. The thrust ofthe amendments
to the federal rules sin~e then has been toward containing the cost
and time expende4 on the exchange of pretrial information. In 1980,
discovery conferences in federal court were first introduced. In 1983,
other amendments followed~ The sentence of Rule 26(a}, which provided that the frequency of use of discovery mechanisms was not to
be limited, was deleted and a sentenc_e was added to Rule 26(b) per72
mitting courts to limit discovery. New Rule 26(g), which encourages
judges to impose appropriate sanctions for discovery abuse, was also
73
added, together with an explicit barring of disproportionate discovery.74 In 1993, new automatic disclosure provisions were introduced
and explicit limits on discovery (depositions and interrogatorie-s)
7
5
were codified. · Amendments to the federal rules expanded the roles
of judges early in lawsuits by requiring the approval of discovery
76
plans.

Ill.

THE DISCOVERY"ABUSE" CONTROVERSY

While liberal discovery was one of the major innovations of the
1938 Federal Rules and the state rules that soon modeled themselves
upon them, dissenting views _a s to its propriety and costs have always_
been present. Even before the rules were completed, Robert Dodge of
Boston and Senator Claude Pepper were fearful that unsavory plaintiffs' lawyers would use_ discovery to ''blackmail'; corporations and
77
their officers. In 1936, Judge Edward Finch of the New York Court
of Appeals criticized the discovery provisions, warning that the pro-

Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)~ The Court also
pointed out that the claimant would have access to the investigative file compiled by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ld.
72. FED. R. CIV. P~ 26 cmt. -3 .
73. See. FED.
R.
CIV.
P~ 26 (advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendments). See
.
generally Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Cost & Delay: The Potential Impact of the 1983
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 JUDICATURE 363 (1983).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
75. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d)t 26(£). Rule 30 was revised to require leave of -c ourt if
more than ten depositions were desired. Amended Rule 33 limited the number of interrogatories to thirty. See Amendments to the Federal Rflles of Civil Procedure,, 146
F.R.D. 40 (1993).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
77. See Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Ciui'l
Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 1936) (statement of
71.

Senator George Wharton Pepper) [hereinafter Proceedings of the Advisory Committee],
quoted in Subrin, Historical Background, supra note 42, at 720--22.
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posed rules would "increase so-called speculative litigation or litigation based upon suspicion rather than facts, with the hope that such
78
fishing may reveal a good cause of action as alleged or otherwise."
In his view, the rules gave so many tools to the person asserting a
claim "that it will be cheaper and more to the self-interest of the de79
fendant to settle for less than the cost to resist." William D.
Mitchell, Chairman of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, predicted: . "We are going to have an outburst against this discovery
business unless we can hedge it about with some appearance of
80
safety against fishing expeditions."
These statements in the pre-Federal Rules 1930's sound decidedly contemporary. There have been a plethora of recent articles and
surveys in which prominent critics describe discovery practice as a
81
major problem. In the view of these detractors, discovery has become too expensive, too time consuming, and often abusive. Thomas
Zlaket, author of Arizona's new discovery rules, articulates this indictment and argues the previous rules encouraged lawyers to act in
82
an overly aggressive and adversarial manner. Professor Arthur
Miller writes that discovery has become both an unnecessary expense
83
and a major cause of delay in modern litigation. Judge William W.
Schwarzer, an ardent proponent of change at the federal level, views
the pretrial process as out of control: "Discovery, originally conceived
as the servant of the litigants to assist them in reaching a just outcome, now tends to dominate the litigation and inflict disproportion84
ate costs and burdens."

78. Hon. Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District
Courts
of
the
United
States,
•
22 A.B.A. J. 809, 809 (1936).
79. Id. at 810.
80. Proceedings of the Advisory Committee, supra note 77, at 722.
81. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992) (referring to our "litigious society" and criticizing
litigation cost and delay); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific
Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 189 (1992);
Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for Discovery Ills?, 25
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 249 (1993); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent's
Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by
Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793. For a compilation of studies addressing discovery under the Federal Rules, see Charles W. Sorenson,
Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) "Much Ado About Nothing?," 46 HAsTINGS L.J. 679, 697 n.57 (1995).
82. Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil
Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1993).
8~. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (1984).
84. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pl'IT. L. REV. 703 (1998).
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While many perceive discovery practice as a serious problem,
others maintain there is little empirical evidence to support what
85
they label as the "pervasive myth of pervasive discovery abuse.'' As
Professor Sorenson concludes:
[L]ittle· empirical research has been done to objectify and quantify
discovery abuse .... [C]laims of discovery abuse have rested largely
on nonevidence and may well be generally exaggerated. Frequently
the assertions of the extent of discovery abuse do not rest on evidence, but only cite to another writer making a similar claim or
simply make a conclusory statement that derives its strength from
86
the fact that it has been repeated so frequently.

These commentators conclude that "discovery normally works well,
and that liberal discovery is on balance a functioning system used ef7
fectively in more than half of lawsuits filed.''8
Defenders of party-controlled liberal pretrial information gathering point to empirical studies that challenge the discovery abuse hypothesis. One study of Iowa state trial courts reported that only
twenty-five percent of all cases had any formal discovery and few of
88
those involved extensive discovery. Most Iowa judges and attorneys
surveyed felt abuse existed only in a small minority of cases.89 The
National Center for State Courts examined discovery activity in trial
courts in Boston, New Haven, Kansas City, Seattle, and Shelton
(Washington). It found that no discovery at all was generated in
forty-two percent of 2,190 c·ases sampled, but that discovery was sig90
nificantly higher in some courts than others. Discovery was more
frequent and higher in volume in tort cases, particularly malpractice
and product liability cases, in contrast to almost no discovery initiated in contract and property cases. The Civil Litigation Research
Project (the "CLRP"), at the University of Wisconsin studied "ordi85. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences far Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393
(1994).
86. Sorenson, supra note 81, 703-04.
87. Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure
Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12
REV. LITIG. 77, 87 (1992).
88. Sorenson, supra note 81, at 706 n.92 (citing DavidS. Walker, Professionalism
and Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 759, 781, 783-86, 789
(1989)). Similar data was reported in a larger 1993 study of discovery in state courts.
Mullenix, supra note 85, at 1440-42.
89. Mullenix, supra note 85, at 1440-42.
90. See Susan Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts Out of Control?, 17 ST. CT. J., Spring 1993, at 8·17 (summarizing relevant data); see also Susan
Keilitz et al., Attorneys' Views of Civil Discovery, 32 JUDGES' J., Spring 1993, at 2-6
(reporting the results of the study). The number of requests per case showed a mean of
6.4 and a median of 4. I d. This suggests that most of the cases are clustered together
in the lower range of discovery volume.
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nary litigation": cases in which more than $1,000 was in controversy,
but excluding ''mega cases." In these cases., the CLRP found that
"relatively little discovery occurs in the ordinary lawsuit. We found
91
no evidence of discovery in over half our cases."
The Federal Judicial Center (the "FJC") used a case-based methodology to examine discovery activity in 3,000 terminated cases in six
urban federal district courts in 1978. The purpose of the FJC study
was to provide data about federal discovery practice. This investigation again confirmed the results reported by the National Center for
State Courts. The study reported that no discovery requests were
filed in fifty two percent of the cases, and that fewer than five per92
cent of the cases had more than ten discovery requests. Over three
decades, empirical research has shown "the typical case has relatively little discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to the
stakes of the litigation, .a nd ... discovery generally but with notable
exceptions yields information that aids in the just dispositions of
93
cases."
While there are sharp disagreements on the merits and costs of
pretrial information gathering, there is also spirited debate about
precisely what constitutes ''abuse." As discussed above, many complain of excessive., inappropriate, and overly expensive discovery.
This view posits that parties, principally plaintiffs, use discovery as a
tactical weapon to impose excessive costs on the other side, thus imposing unfair settlements. Unnecessary, numerous and lengthy
depositions and voluminous interrogatories are employed to exhaust

91. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
90 (1983).
92. Mullenix, supra note 85, at 1434-35 (citing PAUL R. Co~~OLLYET AL., FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIONPROCESS: DISCOVERY

(1978)).
93. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998)~
Another study by the Rand Corporation was based on 5,222 cases filed in 1992-93 in
20 federal districts. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further
Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 618
(1998). Excluded from its sample were the cases which usually involved little or no discovery or management: prisoner cases, administrative review of social security cases,
bankruptcy appeals, foreclosures, forfeiture and penalty cases, and debt recovery. 55%
of the remaining cases had little or no discovery. ld. at 635-36. In more than a third of
these cases, there was no lawyer discovery activity. Similarly, the Federal Judicial
Center studied 1,000 cases closed in the last quarter of 1996 that were likely to involve
discovery. This F JC study excluded social security appeals, student loan collections,
foreclosures, default judgments and cases terminated within 60 days of filing. See
Willging, supra, at 528. This excludes about 55% of the ci vii docket. ld. at 595. The
F JC concluded the median cost of discovery was about $6,500 per client (about half of
median litigation costs). Relative to the stakes involved in these cases, the FJC found
that discovery expenses were quite low.Jd. at 531.
'
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94

the opponent. A contrary view, however, defines abuse as resistance
to legitimate information requests in the hope of either avoiding disclosure or simply buying time and increasing costs for the opponent.
These tactics include: refusing to provide or hiding information, raising frivolous claims of privilege, intentionally construing discovery
requests narrowly, coaching witnesses to avoid disclosing information) and providing deliberately evasive answers to legitimate requests.95
Inextricably intertwined with this debate about the existence of
"abuse" of the discovery process is the tendency to conflate "discovery
96
reform" with "tort reform". Some maintain arguments in favor of
reduced cost ad greater efficiency in discovery are disguised attempts
to promote the interests of repeat corporate defendants and their insurers.97

IV. THE CONSTRICTION OF. DISCOVERY
.

.

.

Similar to developments in federal procedure, the trend to limitations on discovery in state courts began in the 1970s. By 1980, at
least eleven states had placed express limits on the use of interrogatories.98 In 1981, the Texas Supreme Court ordered that, without
agreement or leave of court, only two sets of interrogatories were
permitted, each having a number of questions including subdivisions
99
"so as not to require more than thirty answers." California limited
100
interrogatories to thirty-five in 1986.
The increasing volume of cases was a major factor contributing
Zlaket, supra note 82, at 3 (recognizing that "huge numbers of interrogatories,
marathon depositions, voluminous document requests and other similar tactics have
become today's norn1").
95. Sorenson, supra note 81, at 699-700. Professor Wolfson summarizes this problem by noting that the cause of discovery abuse inheres in a litigation approach characterized by the maxim; "never be candid, never be helpful, and make your opponent
fight for everything he seeks." Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Aduersarittl Dilemma ofCiuil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 45 (1988).
96. See Carrington, supra note 26, at 53.
97. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53
U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 538 (1986) (stating that "many defendants (and their attorneys) in
products liability and antitrust cases have championed the curtailment of discovery");
Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity and Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1997)
(referring to "intensive lobbying efforts of segments of the business community").
98. See, e.g., GA. CODE 81A-133(a); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 33(a)(3); IOWA R. CIV. P.
126(a); KAN. S. CT. R. 135(b); ME. R. CIV. P. 33; MD. R. CIV. P. 417(a)(2); MA. R. CIV. P.
33; MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01; OR. R. CIV. P. 36(A) (does not permit use of interrogatories); R.I. R. Crv. P. 33(b); S.C.R. CIR~ CT. PRAC. 90 (limits to 6 standard interrogatories).
99. TEX. R. CIV. P. 186(5).
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 2030(c)(i) (West Supp. 1991).
94.

•
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101
to checks on open-ended information gathering. The large number
of state court cases and their inability to be handled expeditiously
was already noted in 1986 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ordered that civil cases (with the exception of family law cases)
102
be disposed of "within 24 months after filing." The order noted that
the need to attack the "excessive delay and excessive cost" of litigation103 Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey noted this was largely "a
104
product of a chronic shortage of judges ...." The priority given to
criminal cases intensifies the problem of backlogged civil cases and
further decreases resources available for them!'
The high volume of cases, shortage of judges and courtrooms,
and other deficiencies in the infrastructure needed to handle cases
are widely acknowledged today. In 1999, more than ninety-one million new cases were filed in state courts nationwide, almost the exact
105
number filed in 1998. Two-thirds of states experienced difficulty in
106
maintaining the flow of criminal and civil cases. For example, the
number of tort suits pending in the New York Supreme Court a
trial court in New York increased by fifty-eight percent between
107
1988 and 1996. The average case took forty-seven months to be
108
processed to final disposition. Many Colorado trial judges currently
109
have an active case docket of from 800 to 1,300 cases which, if handled equally, would allow the judge in a 2,000-hour work year to
spend less than three hours on each case. The average case processing time from filing of the complaint to final verdict or judgment in
cases actually tried in the seventy-five largest counties in the United
110
States was 25.6 months in 1996.
•

101. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the So~
cial Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES. 575, 612 n.1 (1997) ("The
volume of cases filed in 1994 in state courts was approximately 86.4 million .... ").
102. Order of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (April 7, 1986), quoted in
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. ·PENN. L. REV. 1999, 2038 (1989).
103. Id.
104. Edward F. Hennessey, 12th Annual Report to the Bar, 73 MAss. L. REV. 3, 11
(1988).
105. NATtL CTR. ON STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 14.
106. Jennifer L. Reichert, Tort Filings Decline in State Courts, Study Shows, TRIAL,
May 1999, at 100.
107. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 13, at 40.
108. !d. at 42.
109. Colorado State Court Admin.'s Office, Third Quarterly Report, Fiscal Year
1999.
110. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CML TRIAL CASES
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 13.
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THE STATES AS ''LABORATORIES"

A.

General Trends

Justice Brandeis praised
the
ability
of
states
to
be
"laboratories"
.
111
i.n which experiments in the law might be conducted. Procedure
rules illustrate this. Analysis of the changes in the discovery provisions of the fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen
years reveals a very complex ~ituation. Most state rules follow the
general outlines of federal procedure; numerous differences, however,
exist. A number of trends are noticeable. First, many state rules now
employ different procedures for information gathering in different
112
types of cases. Second, party-initiated and controlled discovery is
now qualified in many states. Judges often now actively manage this
process. The type and amount of discovery is often explicitly governed by court, with some states creating court--drafted and initiated
113
discovery. Third, while only some states use mandatory disclosure
of information by parties, a very large number of states have placed
114
limits on the amount of discovery parties may employ.
One of the express goals of previous procedural reform in both
federal and state courts was to create "trans-substantive" rules of
115
civil procedure, i.e., uniform stand.a rds for all types of cases. That
concept is under sharp attack today. Should discovery in simple slipand ..fall tort cases be processed in the same fashion as complex prod. .
uct liability rnatters or class actions? This issue has been the subject
116
of ongoing debate. Disparate cases inay involve different numbers
of parties, potential witnesses, complexity of damage calculations,
and other factors.
Many states now divide cases by subject matter or other characteristics. In Arizona, medical malpractice cases have their own
117
rules. In New York, interrogatories and depositions are mutually
exclusive, except with leave of court, in cases seeking recovery for
personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death based solely on
.

•

. .

111. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
112. See discussion infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
113. See discussion infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
114. See discussion infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 29, at 2244-46.
116. See, e.g., infra note 243 and accompanying text.
117. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (requires exchange of all relevant medical records; exchange of uniform interrogatories and a request for production of specified documents
prior to the Rule 16(c) comprehensive pretrial conference).
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119

120

negligence. Some states limit discovery by prisoners. Colorado
and Alaska 121 have special rules for discovery in domestic relations
matters.
Cases are often differentiated by the amount in controversy.
Alaska Rule 26(g) permits only limited• discovery and requires expedited calendaring for personal injury or property damages cases in122
volving less than $100,000. In South Carolina, Rule 35(a) bans
physical or mental examinations unless the case involves more than
123
124
126
$100,000. Texas and Illinois have chosen $50,000 in controversy
as the dividing point for discovery rights. Some states bar all discovery except by agreement of parties or leave of court where the action
126
is in a particular court or involves less than a stipulated amount.
Categorizing cases based on the amount in controversy is common
and familiar in a society which values efficiency, but raises questions
of fairness.
State court judges now "manage" the pretrial process in numerous ways. In addition to the now standard discovery and pretrial conferences, many state rules of procedure explicitly give judges the
power to determine how much discovery will be allowed, when, and
127
by what means. In many states, judges now immerse themselves in
the pretrial process. They learn a great deal about the litigants, their
claims, and the evidence long before a trial begins. This raises le128
gitimate concerns about fairness and impartiality, because discre-

•

118. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3130(1).
119. See, e.g., WIS. R. CIV. P. 804.015.
120. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.2.
121. ALAsKA R. Crv. P. 26.1.
122. ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 26(g).
123. S.C. R. Crv. P. 35(a).
124. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(a).
125. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(a).
126. E.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.302(A)(2) (providing that in District Court no discovery is
permitted). Under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 600.8301, Michigan District
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does
not exceed $25,000.00. S.C. R. CIV. P. 33 likewise prohibits depositions for cases under
$10,000.00 and interrogatories if the value of the case is not more than $25,000.00.
127. See, e.g., Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
("Supreme Court Rule 214 confers wide discretion on the trial judge in control of pretrial discovery."); Indus. Coatings Group, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 658 N.E.2d
1338, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("The law in Illinois recognizes that a circuit court not
only has wide discretion in controlling the course of discovery, but also to enter appropriate orders to enforce the requirement that a party act with diligence in pursuing
discovery and moving a case to a conclusion.").
128. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982);
Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
305, 314 (1986).
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129

tion is almost without bounds at this stage. Appellate courts will
130
not ordinarily overturn such rulings. Indeed, many pretrial decisions, especially discovery disputes, are made off the record, or sim·
ply announced and entered into the record without supporting opinions or reasons. As Professor Malot recognizes: "Judges deciding how
to manage cases on their dockets have a wide array of tactics avail·
able and, indeed, choose to exercise their supervisory discretion in
widely disparate ways, even ·when handling the same exact case."131
The discretionary and often irreviewable power of trial courts in the
pretrial process is aptly described by a Colorado Supreme Court Justice: "While an appellate court may have the opportunity to reverse
any individual trial judge once every few years, I know that trial
judges, in their numerous workday rulings, reverse appellate courts
132
every day." Moreover, decisions directing compliance with discovery
133
orders are typically not final, appealable orders.
134
Very broad sanctions, including contempt, are available and a
trial court's determination of sanctions will 'likewise not be disturbed
135
absent abuse of discretion. Dean Carrington, referring to the federal district courts, characterizes judges with such powers as "chancellors sitting on the woolsack of autocratic power and less like offi~

129. See, e.g.,_Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs~, 995 P.2d. 721, 732 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1999) (determining that a trial court did not abuse discretion by denying
sanctions for failure to disclose documents); In re Kelly Rogers, 43 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2001) (determining that a trial court did not abuse discretion by ordering redeposition of four witnesses).
130. Compare D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1041 (Ill. 1997) (holding that a "trial
court did not ,e rr in determining that the subject matters were to be discussed"), and
Ruane v. Amore, 677 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that a circuit
court "did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motions to reopen discovery
and to disclose an expert witness"), with Vitacco v. Eckberg, 648 N.E.2d 1010, 1013,
208 Ill. Dec. 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a "trial court abused its discretion
when it denied plaintiffs motion to ·c ompel a more complete answer to the interrogatory").
131. Jonathan T. Malot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in
Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955~ 1004. (1998).
13.2. Hon. Gregory Kellam Scott, Judge-Made Law: Constitutional Duties & Obligations under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 517 (1999). I
thank Prof. Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin Law School for bringing this
reference to my attention.
133. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young, 614 N .E.2d 423, 425-426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding that discovery orders imposing sanctions are not final and appealable); Brown
v. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 484 N.E.2d 369, 370
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that an enforcement order by trial court for production of
records is not final and thus not app_e alable).
134. See discussion infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Colis v. City of Chicago, 571 N.E.2d 951, 980-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
B&Y Heavy Movers, Inc. v. Fluor Constructors, Inc., 570 N .E.2d 777, 783 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991).
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cers of the law accountable for their exercise of official power." In
the federal courts, much of pretrial litigation is overseen by magis137
trates who will not preside at the trial unless the parties consent.
The use of magistrates or similar personnel is far less common in
state courts.
.
Without pressing the analogy, some of these rules nudge state
138
139
trial judges closer to a civil.law approach to the pretrial stage. As
Professor· Hazard finds, "[t]he practice of judicial gathering of evidence, jn distinction to party generated efforts, is a major distinction
between civil law and other systems of litigation and our own [com4
mon law] modern civil procedure.'n o A number of states allow judges
to determine what is a "complex" case and then to determine the
141
course of discovery. In Colorado, all discovery is under the control
142
of a "case management order."
An accelerating trend in state civil procedure rules is the promulgation and use of court created, rather than lawyer-initiated, discovery. In Arizona, there are currently twenty-two standard uniform
interrogatories for personal injury actions and twenty-three standard
143
uniform interrogatories for contract actions~ Connecticut uses form
interrogatories in cases of personal injury actions arising from the
ope,r ation or ownership of a motor vehicle or the ownership, mainte144
145
146
nance, or control of real property. New Jersey , Colorado, Flor•

136. Paul P. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for
Draftsmen ofRules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY 456, 46-3 (2000).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).
138. Civil law jurisdictions usually follow the French or German model rather than
the English common law tradition. For an introduction to these and other legal traditions, see generally RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD
. TODAY (3d ed. 1985).
139. DAMASKA, supra note 28, at 101 ("[l]n common law systems, the parties perform a number of activities that are intrinsic to the office of the judge on the continent"); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure Reflections on the Comparison of
Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 411-12 (1960) (explaining that in the German system
the court does not rely on the parties to bring relevant law forward, and judges play a
central role in leading the parties to the development of their case).
140. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdic~
tions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1998).
141. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(a),(b); ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a)(l}; see also VT. R.
Crv. P. 16, CAL. SUP. CT. CASE MG'i'. R. 2106, JUD. ADMIN. STD. § 19.
142. COLO. R. CIV. P. 30, 31, 33.
143. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1; For applicability of these interrogatories, see ANN. OF R.
PRAC. SUP. CT. ARIZ. XVII, app., at 163~68.
144. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13·6(b); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-6(b) (limiting interrogatories in personal injury actions alleging liability based on the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle to Forms 106.10A, 106.10B, or 106.10C); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §
13·9(a) (limiting requests for production to "Forms 106.lla, 106.llb, and/or 106.1lc").
145. N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(1).
.

•
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150

ida, Maryland, South Carolina and others likewise encourage
or require the use of pattern discovery in specific types of cases. California has uniform sets of interrogatories for different types of
151
cases.
Powerful incentives are employed to encourage the use of these
court-initiated forms. Numerical limits are placed, for example, on
the number of interrogatories, requests for admission and other discovery. Party initiated interrogatories must typically count each subpart as a single interrogatory. Uniform interrogatories, on the other
152
hand, even those containing subparts, are counted as one.
In some states, automatic discovery is in effect. A party is
deemed to have been automatically served with applicable form interrogatories or other requests for information without any actual
153
request. New Jersey utilizes "pattern" interrogatories in this man154
ner. The opposite party, once a case is filed, must automatically respond to the court-created discovery without service of any paper. 155
A number of states require mandatory disclosure of certain in166
formation by the parties within a specified period of time. Just as
significant, there are often limits on particular discovery tools. At
157
least thirty-four states limit interrogatories; many permit thirty

146. COLO. R. Crv. P. Form 21.2 (providing unifortn Requests for Production in domestic relations matters).
147. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.340(a) (requiring that "if the Supreme Court has a form of interrogatories for the type of action, the initial interrogatories shall be in the forrn approved by the Court").
148. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a) (counting court "form" interrogatories only as a single
interrogatory).
149. S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(l)-(b)(7) (setting out standard form interrogatories to be
used).
150. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 2030(c), 2033.5; CONN.
SUPER. CT. R. §§ 13-6, 13-9.
151. See Mark A. Neubauer, Check-the-Box Pleadings, 11 LITIG. No. 2 , at 28, 29, 54
(Winter 1985) (discussing California's form complaints).
152. See, e.g., MD. R. Crv. P. 2-421(a).
153. N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(2); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-6 (allows service of
Notice of Interrogatories in lieu of actually serving the interrogatories set forth in the
forms); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-8(a) (provides no objection may be filed with respect
to interrogatories set forth in the form).
154. N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(2).
155. ld.
156. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 26; ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d);
UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
157. ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 33(a); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.340(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 213(c) (except
for standard fortns of interrogatories for different classes of cases under Rule 213(j));
IOWA R. CIV. P. 126(a); KY. R. CIV. P. 33.01(3); ME. R. CIV. P. 33(a); MD. R. CIV. P. 2421(a); MAss. R. CIV. P. 33(a); MISS. CT. R. 33(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3233A.
(West Supp. 2001); R.I. CT. R. 33(b); VA. S. CT. R. 4:8(g); WYO. R. CIV. P. 33.
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159

but some allow more and some less. State rules often restrict the
160
161
number and length of depositions. California, Iowa, and Okla162
homa all limit requests for admissions.
Numerical limits are imposed on all parties to a suit, without regard for which party has the
burden of proof, or the feasibility of other discovery devices. In many
cases, this may create inequities.
Maine is experimenting with a new informal process for quickly
163
resolving discovery disputes. In this jurisdiction, such disputes are
not .handled via the normal and traditional. in court motions to compel, but rather through alternate means. Maine Rule 26(g) empha164
sizes the oral resolution of discovery issues. If written materials
must be examine.d in order to resolve a discovery dis.p ute, the moving
party must briefly describe the dispute in a letter and provide limited
165
written materials to the judge. No written argument is allowed
166
without prior leave of court.
Time limits for the completion of discovery are commonly imposed. Utah Rule 26(d) requires no more than 240 days to complete
.

158. ALA. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing 40); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a) (allowing 40); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE. § 2030(c) ( allowing 35); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing
40); GA. R. CIV. P. 9-11-33 (allowing 50); HAW. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing 60) (cross
referencing Haw. R. Cir. Ct. 30(b)); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 33(a)(3) (allowing 40); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC ANN. art 1457B (West Supp. 2001) (allowing 35); MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01(a)
(allowing 50); MONT. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing 50); NEB. R. GIV. P. 33 (allowing 50);
NEV. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (allowing 40), N.H., SUPER. CT. R. 36 (allowing 5); N.C. R. CIV. P-.
33 (allowing 50); OHIO R. Crv. P. 33(A) (allowing 40); S.C. R. CIV. P. 33 (up to 50 interrogatories where. the amount ~n controversy is greater than $25,000); W.VA. R. CIV. P.
33(a) (allowing 40); see also N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(1) (interrogatories in sp.e cified
cases are limited to Uniform Interrogatories in Appendix II, plus 10 supplemental
ql):estions without subparts).
159. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(3) (limiting to 25 the number of Level 1 discovery inter:..
roga,tories); TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(3) (Level2 discovery); UTAH R. CIV. P. 33 (limiting
interrogatories to 25:)~
160. ALASKA R. CIV., P. 30, 31(a)(2)(A); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(a) (no depositions upon
oral examination .e xcept for document custodians); D.C. SUPER CT. R. CIV. P. 30, 31;
ME. R. CIV. P. 30(a), 31; S.C. R. CIV. P-. 30 (no depositions allowed for cases of less than
$10,0.00); UTAH R. CIV. P. 30, 31; VA. S. CT. R. 4:6A; WYO. R. CN. P. 30(a)(2), 31.
161. ILLS. CT. R. 206(d); ME. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2); TEX. R. CN. P. 190.2(c)(2) (Level 1
discovery), 190.3(b)(2) (Level 2 discovery), l99.5(c) (individual witness).
162. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 2033(c)(l), (2), (3) (West 1999); IOWA R. CIV. P. 127(a);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3236A. (West 1993).
163. ME. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
164. Id.
165. ld.
166. ME. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l). The Advisory Committee Notes state that "[p]rior to the
amendment, it was not unusual for a discovery motion to wait several months to be
reached on the civil motion list and for the case to be completely stalled during that
period.'' See 14 ME. B. J. 110, 112 (1999).
.·
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167

discovery after an answer is filed. This is replicated in many of the
168
other states. A number of jurisdictions have gone even further in
transforming the pretrial process. I turn now, with closer examination, to these experiments.

B.

Specific Case Studies
1.

Texas

Reform of the civil discovery rules in Texas began in 1991. Over
a period of eight years, a variety of study groups drafted, solicited
169
comments, and debated proposed revisions. The new Texas discov170
ery rules became effective January 1, 1999, and applied to pending
171
cases as well as newly filed cases after that date. The overall purpose of the changes was to make pretrial inforn1ation gathering consistent with Rule 1 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Texas
Rules") ''to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication
of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive
172
law." The revisions were to reduce "costs, delays and misuse" asso173
ciated with discovery practice. The scope of discovery was left unaltered; parties may obtain discovery of any matter that is not privileged and is relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
174
of admissible evidence.
The revision's most salient characteristic is limits on the volume

167. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(d).
168. See, e.g., KA.N. R. CIVP. 26.1 (requiring discovery to be "completed four months
after the case becomes at issue"); VA. Loc. R. 26(D)(3) (asserting that "parties shall
complete all forms of expert disclosure and discovery not later than 30 days after the
date upon which the plaintiff [must] ... disclose a contradictory or rebuttal evidence").
169. The revisions of the discovery rules followed similar procedural reforms in
other aspects of Texas court practice. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure were
revised and became effective September 1, 1997. In March of 1998, a new combined set
of evidence rules for civil and criminal cases were jointly promulgated by the Texas
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal. TEX. R. EVID. 101. The developments in the new discovery system in Texas are exhaustively detailed in Kenneth E.
Shore, A History of the 1999 Discovery Rules: The Debates and Compromises, 20 REV.
LITIG. 89 (2000).
170. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190-215.
171. A few exceptions were made in order to avoid unfairness to parties in previously filed cases. See, e.g., TEX. R. Crv. P. 193 (concluding material, which exempted
parties from updating existing discovery responses to comply with the new rules).
172. TEX. R. CIV. P. 1.
173. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING THE 1999 AMENDMENTS TO THE
RULES OF CML PROCEDURE GOVERNING DISCOVERY, Order of Aug. 5, 1998.
174. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). This standard, however, must be read in light of recent cases concerning scope of law discovery under the former rules. Rule 192, cmt. 1
(incorporating recent cases including Texaco v. Sanderson, 898 S.W. 3d. 813 (Tex.
1995) and Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989).
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of discovery. Texas Rule 190 divides cases into categories and codifies
limits on discovery in each category. Three tiers of "discovery control
plans" are created denominated Levels 1, 2, and 3. Each civil case
175
must be in one category at all times. While assignment to Level 1
or 2 is determined by rule, Level 3 may only be activated by court order.176 The limits imposed by Rule 190 complement other specific lim177
its in the discovery rule-s. Parties are permitted, except where pro178
hibited, to modify any procedure or limitation by _a greement.
179
Level 1 cases involve monetary reli~f of $50,000 or less and divorces that do not involve children where the value of the marital es180
tate is less than $50,000. Discovery is limited severely in these
cases: for example, each party is restricted to six hours of oral deposi. .
181
182
tions, interrogatories may not exceed twenty-five, and all other
183
limitations set by other rules apply. The choice to place a case in
Level 1 is made by the plaintiffs pleadings, but they may later be
amended to invoke Level 2 later. Additional discovery in Level 1 is
184
only permitted by agreement or court order. If a timely filed pleading later renders placement in Level 1 inapplicable, discovery re185
opens, and the rules governing the new discovery level will apply.
Defendants may transfer a case to Level 2 by asserting their own affirmative claim for relief that falls outside the scope of Level 1 or by
186
seeking a court order.
Level 2 is the default category. It applies when Level 1 is inap187
plicable and when a court has not entered a Level 3 discovery plan.
Under Level 2, parties use the ordinary Texas discovery rules with
specified limits. In non. .family law matters, ,d iscovery must be com~
pleted within a "discovery period," i.e., thirty days before the set trial
date or nine months after the earlier of the date of the first oral
deposition or the due date of the first response to a written discovery
175. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.1 & cmt. 1 (1999).
176. Id.
177. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.6 & cmt. 5 (1999).
178. E.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(2) & cmt. 1 (determining that parties in Level 1
cases cannot agree to permit more than ten hours of deposition per party).
179. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(a)(l) & cmt. 1 (1999).
180. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(a)(2) & cmt. 2 (1999).
181. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(2). This may be extended to ten hours by agreement.

I d.
182. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(3).
183. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2.
184. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(b); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1. Plaintiff is, how-e ver,
required to obtain leave of court to amend pleadings to change discovery levels within
45 days of trial, which may be granted only for good cause. TEX. R. CIV. P. l90.2(b).
185. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(d).
186. TEX. R. CIV. P. l90.2(b)(2)-(3).
187. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(a), cmt. 1 (1999).
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188

request in the case. An aggregate limit of fifty hours is imposed on
each side to depose parties, persons subject to those parties' control,
189
and experts retained by opponents. Interrogatories are limited to
twenty-five. 190
Discovery in Level 3 cases (complex cases that do not fit Levels 1
191
and 2) is overtly managed by the court. The trial judge determines
discovery periods, limitations on the amount of discovery, deadlines
for pleading, and any other matter that may be addressed in a pre192
trial scheduling order under Rule 166. The court may modify any
193
discovery procedure or limit information gathering for "good cause."
The trial judge has wide latitude in managing the pretrial phase.
The revised Rules make explicit new demands. Parties and their
attorneys are admonished to cooperate in discovery and to make rea194
sonable agreements for the efficient disposition of the case. A
signed certificate that such a reasonable attempt was "made to resolve the dis·p ute" without court intervention must accompany "[a]ll
195
discovery motions or requests for hearings." Civility in pretrial proceedings is expected. All depositions are to be conducted as if they
196
were in court. Counsel are enjoined to ''be courteous to each other
and to the witnesses;" witnesses are admonished not to be evasive or
197
delaying. Private conferences between a witness and his or her law198
yer are strictly limited. Coaching and colloquy are prohibited, and
199
restrictions are imposed about how objections are to be presented.
"Argumentative or suggestive objections or explanations" are prohibited.200 In addition, Rule 192.4, modeled on Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules, gives the trial court power to limit any discovery if it is

188. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1)(B). The exception for Family Code cases recognizes
that the size of the marital estate and the other issues inherent in disposition of such
cases are often in flux until the time of trial. Id.
189. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(2).
190. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(3).
191. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4, 4(a).
192. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(b).
193. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1, cmt. 1 (1999).
194. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.2.
195. ld. The signature of an attorney on a discovery request, notice, response, or
objection is required, which certifies that, based on the signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is consistent with the
rules, has a good faith factual basis, is made for a valid purpose, and is not unreasonably or unduly burdensome. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.3(c).
196. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(d).
197. /d.
198. !d. Conferences are prohibited except for the purpose of determining whether a
privilege should be asserted. ld
199. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(e), 199.5(0 cmt. 4 (1999).
200. Id.
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it is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive or [if] the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
201
outweighs its likely benefit." The new rules thus establish a "proportionality" limit upon discovery.
Aside from the trifurcation of cases, the most important innovation of the revised th,e Texas Rules w,a s a new discovery device, "requests for disclosure,'' by which parties may obtain basic discoverable
information without objection, work product claims, unnecessary exp,e nse, or inconvenience. 202 In Texas, requests for disclosure, unlike
203
Rule 26(a)(l) of the Federal Rules, are obtainable only on demand.
By this tool, parties may obtain "the legal theories and factual bases
of the responding part[ies'] claims or defenses," as_well as basic dam204
age theory.
205
Failure to fully respond is an abuse of the discovery process.
The Rules state that "[n]o objection or assertion of work product is
206
permitted ....". The following items may be dis_covered with a request for disclosure: "correct names of the parties to the lawsuit [and
identity of potential parties]; legal theories and, in general, the factual bases of ... claims or defenses; the amount and any method of
calculating economic damages; [identity] of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each person' connection with the case;" testifying expert's identity, general substance of
opinions, documents, and resume; insurance agreements and settle207
ment agreements; witness statements; medical records and bills.
Documents must be served with the disclosure response, unless voluminous, in which case the_time and place for production must be
208
stated. Responses that have been amended or supplemented may
be used for impeachment, except for disclosure of legal theories, fac209
tual bases of claims or defenses, and. damages. [need to
In an attempt to respond to criticisms that the disclosure requirements violate the ethical and practical obligations of attorneys
to clients, responding parties are not required to marshal evidence or
210
brief legal positions. The rule also provides that responses to disclosures concerning liability and damages contentions cannot be used
201.

.202.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4 (a)-(b).
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, cmt. 1 (1999).
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.1.

203.
204. TEX. R. CIV. P.
205. TEX. R. CIV. P~
206. TEX~ R. CIV. P.
207.; TEX. R. CIV. P.
208. TEX. R. CIV. P.
209. TEX. R. CIV. P.
210. TEX. R. CIV. P.

'

'

194.2.
194, cmt. 1 (1999).
I

194.5.
194.2.

194.4.

194.6, cmt. 3 (1999).
194.2, cmt. 2 (1999).
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as admissions if a response is later changed by amendment or supplementation.211 This presumably encourages parties to disclose and
discuss their basic legal and factual assertions early in the case.
2.

Arizona
212

Historically, Arizona civil procedure followed federal practice.
213
That congruence has now disappeared in many important subjects.
In September of 1990, a special committee, chaired by Thomas
214
Zlaket, proposed major revisions to the discovery provisions of the
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Arizona Rules") to make them
"more efficient, more expeditious, less exp·e nsive, and more accessible
to the people.'~ The committee concluded that existing practice in
216
civil cases was causing undue expense and delay. Justice Zlaket
wrote later, "huge numbers of interrogatories, marathon depositions,
multiple experts, voluminous document requests, and other similar
217
tactics have become today's norm." While the new rules were to
eliminate unnecessary discovery, the committee was also explicit
about the need to encourage greater professionalism among attorneys. "In recent years there-has also been an increase in abusive, obstructive and contentious behavior by members of the bar. Such conduct, unfortunately, is often expected and seemingly rewarded."218
The ultimat~ goal of the Arizona amendments was to increase volun·
tary cooperation and exchange of information. After soliciting public
comment, and conducting an experiment with the proposed rules in a
few trial courts in Maricopa County, the Arizona Supreme Court en219
acted the proposals effective July 1, 1992.
The new Arizona Rules embrace the concept of disclosure. Discovery has largely been relegated to a process for filling gaps in the
215

211. TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.6, cmt. 3 (1999).
212. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1381.
213. The Federal Rules were amended in 1993 and in 2000, and the difference between the two sets of rules has now become less stark. The 1993 Amendments to Rule
26, for example, included (a)(l)-(4), mandatory duty to disclose basic information about
witnesses, documents, and exhibits without request; (b)(2), power of court to limit
depositions and interrogatories; (b)(4), right to depose expert witnesses; (b)(5), notice
and specific basis for claimed protective order; (c) certification of efforts to resolve disputes; (d) and (0 meeting before commencement of discovery; (g)(1) signatures on all
disclosures. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
214. · Hon. Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
11, 11-13~ n.6 (1993). In 1992, Mr. Zlaket was appointed to the Arizona Supreme
Court. Id. at n.6. The rules are commonly called the "Zlaket Rules." Id. at 12-13.
215. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1 cmt. (1991).
216. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 3.
217. ld.
218. ld. at 4.
219. Id.
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disclosure statements. The traditional discovery tools deposition,
interrogatories, etc. are still available under new Arizona Rule 26.1,
but they are subject to strict numerical limits. Moreover, the standard for disclosure, "any infortnation that the party believes may be
220
relevant to the issues in the case," is purposefully broad. It accords
with the general premise of the new rules that disclosure should remove the adversarial component from the pretrial exchange of infor221
mation, confining the adversary process to trial. Attempts to avoid
disclosure of information may trigger severe judicial sanctions. Indeed the Court Comment to Rule 26.1 stresses the need to deal with
222
abuses in a "strong and forthright fashion."
All parties are to disclose voluntarily all information necessary
223
to process the case. This includes the factual and legal basis of each
claim or defense, information about each witness, including experts,
224
tangible evidence, relevant documents and more. Rule 26.1(a)(4)
requires the disclosure of all witnesses who the party "believes" may
have relevant knowledge, while Rule 26.1(a)(9) requires the produc225
tion of documents that the party "believes may be .relevant." Additional or amended di~closures are required "in no event more than
thirty days after the [new or different] information is revealed to or
226
discovered by the disclosing party .... " This includes simultaneous
disclosure ·of all experts "expected to testify" at trial, together with
"the subject matter," "substance of the facts and opinions," "summary
of the grounds for each opinion," and "qualifications" of the expert.
227
Any report prepared by the expert must also be disclosed. The rule
is to be enforced by sanctions imposed based on a "disclose it or lose
it" philosophy; any information not timely disclosed is barred from
228
trial except by leave of c.o urt for good cause shown.
Party-initiated discovery has been overtly limited. With the ex229
ception of "complex cases," depositions of persons other than parties
and expert witnesses are disallowed, and no deposition may exceed
220. See ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(a)(4).
221. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1 cmt. (1991)
222. Id.
223. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a). New Rule 26.1 requires parties to simultaneously serve
disclosure statements within forty days after the filing of a responsive pleading. ARIZ.
R. Crv. P. 26.1(b).
224. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(a)(l)~(a)(9).
225. ARIZ. R. Crv. P . 26.1(a). Probably to ensure that clients were also involved and

appraised of the new rules, disclosure statements were required to be signed under
oath by the party making the disclosure. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(d).
226. Id.
227. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l(a)(6).
228. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(c). Rule 26.l(c) was deleted in 1996 but a modified rule was
incorporated into Rule 37(c)(l)-(2).
229. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 7.
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four hours in length. Interrogatories, both uniform and nonuniform, are limited to a total of forty, with each subpart to a non231
uniform interrogatory counted as a separate interrogatory. Requests for production are limited to one set, containing not more than
32
ten categories of items/ and each side is restricted to twenty-five
233
requests for .admissions, Only one expert witness per side per issue
234
is permitted to testify.
In theory, the Arizona Rules should accelerate the resolution of
cases and decrease cost. Information is available sooner and without
the necessity for formal discovery devices. However, no statistical
confirmation of these premises is available and no studies have been
performed regarding the effect of the rules despite the fact that the
rules have been in effect for more than nine years. Prior to adopting
the disclosure-discovery changes statewide, however, Arizona imple235
mented the rules in a test program in a single county. The superior
court was assigned 8,288 cases under the proposed revised rules dur236
ing an eighteen~month period, and reported the results were promising. Cases using the new procedures were terminated almost two
months earlier on average than cases using traditional discovery
methods, and depositions and other discovery devices were used far
237
less. In complex cases, however, disclosure seemed to make no dif238
ference in the use of the traditional discovery devices. Attorneys
who handled cases under the new system commented that disclosure
significantly reduced the amount of time needed to exchange infor239
mation for appropriate resolution of cases.
· Application of the new Arizona Rules has lead to a series of appellate decisions tempering the disclosure requirement. In Bryan v.
240
Riddell, a trial court barred certain witnesses who had not been
disclosed from .testifying. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, because, although the disclosure "statement" was incomplete, the relevant information had been given to the opposing counsel in other discovery.241 The Court noted:
The disclosure rules must be interpreted in harmony with their
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(a), (d).
See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a).
See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
See AR.lZ. R. Crv. P. 36(b).
See ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 43(g).
Myers, supra note 214, at 11-.13 & n.6.
236~ Id. at 20.
237. Id.
238. ld.
239.. ld. at 23.
240. 875 P.2d 131 (Ariz. 1994).
241. ld. at 135 & n.5-.
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underlying philosophy and purpose ~ ... Ordinarily, therefore; the
disclosure statement is the primary vehicle by which the parties
are informed of their opponent's case .... Here, however, the dis•
closure statements was not so critical, as discovery was essentially
242
complete.
•

A similar situation was presented in Allstate [n,s urance Co. u.
243
O'Toole. Although the disclosure statement of the plaintiff was not
timely, the Supreme Court construed the "good cause" exception for
application of sanctions liberally. No trial date had yet been set in
the case, and the court affirmed the trial court's. refusal to exclude
244
untimely disclosed information.
Subsequently, Rule 37(c) was
amended to allow trial courts considerable discretion whether to al245
low untimely disclosed material to be used.
3.

Illinois

The Illinois Supreme Court significantly amended its state's civil
discovery rules effective January 1, 1996. The Illinois Supreme Court
Rules (the "Illinois Rules") were,modeled on the Discovery Guidelines
adopted by the National Conference of State Trial Judges. The new
rules provide for much greater judicial involvement and discretion in
managing the pretrial phase. In addition, for selected cases, a new
set of rules requiring mandatory disclosure and limiting discovery is
imposed. These rule changes were intended to curb unnecessary expenses, delays and abuses.
a.

Pretrial Management

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218 requires pretrial management
of cases by trial judges to an extent previously unseen in Illinois
practice. Although traditional discovery devices are still available,
246
trial courts have broad authority to supervise the process. Each
trial judge is required to hold an initial case management conference
247
within thirty-five days after the case is at issue. At this conference,
the trial court and parties are to first evaluate the case and consider

242. ld. at 136.
243. 896 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1995).
244. Id. at 258-59; see also Aguirre v. FQrrest, 923 P.2d 859, 863 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996) (affirming the trial court's decision to allow an untimely disclosed e~pert totes·
tify).
245. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 3'7(c); see also State Bar Committee Notes (1996 & 1997
Amendments).
246. ILL. S. CT. R. 20l(c).
247. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a). No. more than 182 days after the filing of the complaint to
hold this conference. I d. The Rule requires that the conference be attended by "counsel
familiar with the case and authorized to act.'' Id.
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248

its "nature, issues, and complexity.'' The type and amount of pretrial information gathering permitted is to reflect the specific nature
of each case. The order issued after this conference controls all pre249
trial processes.
Under Rule 218, the trial court may determine what discovery
will be permitted, including specific limits on the number and duration of depositions and the number of opinion witnesses that can be
250
called to testify. The trial court is to set a date for a subsequent
management conference to adjust the process as warranted by inter251
vening developments. Deadlines for the completion of all disc~very
25
2
and the setting a trial date are mandated. · The deadlines for the
completion of discovery must be at least sixty days before the date on
which the "trial court reasonably anticipates the trial will commence."253 Continuing judicial supervision of the pretrial process is
also envisioned. As the Committee Comments to the Rule state: "By
regulating discovery on a case.. specific basis, the trial court will keep
control of the litigation and thereby prevent the potential for discov254
ery abuse and delay which might otherwise result."
b.

Pretrial Limitations and Sanctions

Under Illinois Rule 201(k) the parties are admonished to "facilitate discovery under these rules and ... make reasonable attempts to
255
resolve differences over discovery." The Rule also requires that the
attorneys ultimately responsible for trying the case be involved in
256
personal consultation about discovery matters. Trial and discovery
are thus seen as an integrated process, although this may be at odds
•

248. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a)(l). The Committee Comments to Rule 218(a)(l) describe
the goals as follows:
The new rule recognizes that each case is a composite of variable factors including the nature, number and complexity of the substantive and procedural issues which are involved, the number of parties and potential witnesses as well as the type and economic value of the relief sought. Less complex cases with limited damages and fewer parties require less discovery and
involve less time to prepare than do cases with multiple complex issues involving numerous parties and damages or other remedies of extraordinary
economic consequence. By focusing upon each case within six months after it
is filed, the court and the parties are able to formulate a case management
plan which avoids both the potential abuses and injustices that are inherent
in the previous "cookie cutter" approach.
249. Id. 2l8(c).
250. ILL. 8. CT. R. 2l8(a)(5).
251. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(b) & comm. cmts.
252. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(c).
253. Id.
254. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(c) & comm. cmts.
255. ILL. S. CT. R. 201(k)~
256. Id.
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257

with much contemporary practice.
Significant restrictions are placed on discovery. Illinois Rule
206(d) limits any deposition to three hours, except by agreement of
258
the parties or order of the court. In multi-party litigation, this requires coordination among attorneys for clients that may have conflicting interests. All objections at depositions must "be concise, stat259
ing the exact legal nature of the objection." No more than thirty in260
terrogatories are permitted, a limitation ·apparently in response to
complaints of "needless, repetitious and burdensome interrogatories."261 A duty is imposed to supplement or amend prior answers to
262
interrogatories '':seasonably." Simultaneously, the Supreme Court
263
adopted form interrogatories by administrative order, which were
264
accompanied by incentives to encourage their use. Each form interrogatory used counts as one, notwithstanding the fact that it might
265
have numerous sub-p arts. If. a non-form interrogatory containing
subparts is propounded by a party; each of those subparts is counted
266
against the allotted thirty interrogatories. The identity of all opinion witnesses, whether expert or lay, must be disclosed together with
267
their conclusions and opinions. This req~irement is applicable to all
cases, regardless of the amount of damages demanded.
In the event that the parties or counsel do not comply with the
268
new rules, a series of sanctions ·are enumerated, such as barring.

257. ILL. S. CT. R. 20l(k) & comm. cmts.
258. ILL. S. CT. R. 206(d).
·259. ILL. S. CT. R. 206(c)(3). Rule 207(a) was amended to permit a deponent to make
only those corrections to the transcript which are "based on errors in reporting or transcription." ILL. S. CT. R. 207(a) ("The deponent may not otherwise change either the
form or substance of his or her answers.-").
260. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(c).
261. ILL. S. CT. R. 213 (c) & comm. cmts.

262. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(i).
263. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(j).
264. The Illinois procedure is similar to that employed in other states. See, e.g.,
CONN. SUPER, CT. R. § 73-6(b); MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a); S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(b) (l)-(b)(7).

265. ILL. S. CT.. R. 213(j) & Standard lnterrogs. under S. CT.. R. 213(j).
266. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(j) & Standard lnterrogs. under S. CT. R. 213(j).
267. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(g), 213(g) cmt., 218(a)(5).
268. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c). In the event of discovery abuse, it appears that Illinois
courts have available to them any sanction thought to be properly exercisable by a
trial court. Rule 219(c) specifically authorizes the imposition of the follQwing sanctions:
(i) That further proceedings be stayed until the order or rule is complied
with;
(ii) That the offending party be debarred from filing any other pleading relating to any issue to which the refusal or failure relates;
(iii) That the offending party be debarred from maintaining any particular
claim, counterclaim, third-party complaint, or defense relating to that
•
ISsue;
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testimony, striking pleadings, entering judgment, together with a
269
catchall power to enter "s-uch orders as are just." The trial court is
authorized to impose an "appropriate sanction" upon a party, a
27
party's attorney, or· both. ? In addition, Rule· 219(a) and (b) provide
for the payment of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees when an
271
abuse of discovery is found. The trial judge may impose against a
party or a party's attorney "a monetary penalty" where the conduct is
272
found to be willful and may also conduct contempt proceedings.
'

c.

Mandatory Disclosure and Discovery Limits in
.
(
Cases lnvolvtng Less Than $50,000
.

Another major reform in Illinois was the imposition of mandatory· disclosure requirements and strict limitations on discovery in
273
civil actions seeking money damages not in excess of $50,000, · a
limit particularly significant given that more than ninety percent of
274
cases filed in Illinois are estimated to fall within this category. If a
judgment is rendered in excess of that amount, Rule 222(b) requires
a post-trial reduction of judgment "to an amount not in excess of
$50,000.'' Any party seeking damages may invoke the mandatory disclosure rules as well as the limitations on traditional discovery procedures. On the other hand, the party from whom damages are
275
sought is afforded the protection of a damage cap.
Disclosure of information and documents is to occur automati276
cally; no request is needed. The requirement for disclosure is im(iv) That a witness be barred from testifying concerning-that issue;
(v) That, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to which that issue is material, a judgment by default be entered against the offending
party or that the offending party's action be dismissed with or without
prejudice.; or
(vi) That any portion of the offending party's pleadings relating to that issue
be stricken and, if thereby made appropriate, judgment be entered as to
that issue.
(vii) That in cases where a tnoney judgment is entered against a party subject to sanctions under this subparagraph, order the offending party to
pay interest at the rate provided by law for judgments for any period of
pretrial delay attributable to the offending party's conduct.

I d.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
tions,
274.

ILL. S. CT.

R. 219(c).

Id.
ILL. S. CT. R. 219(a)-(b).

ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c).
ILI~. S. CT. R. 222. ("[The] [r]ule does not apply to small claims, ordinance violaactions brought pursuant to 750 ILCS, and actions seeking equitable relief.").
Steven F. Pflaum & FaustinA. Pipal, Jr., Successful Practice Under the New
Illinois Discovery Rules, 9 CHI. B AsS'N. REC. 20, 28 (1995).
275. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(b).
276. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(c).
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posed immediately upon the filing of a party's affidavit stating
277
whether the total of money damages requested exceeds $50,000.
Disclosure must be accomplished "within 120 days after the filing of
a responsive pleading to the complaint, counter-complaint, third
party complaint, etc." unless otherwise agreed to by the parties or or278
dered by the court. The information and documents to be disclosed
include: (1) the factual basis of each claim or defense; (2) the legal
theory upon which each claim or defense is based including citations
of pertinent legal or case authorities where necessary for a reasonable understanding of the claim or defense; (3) the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of any witnesses whom the disclosing party
expects to call at trial with a designation of the subject matter about
which each witness might be called to testify; (4) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons whom the party believes may have knowledge or information relevant to the events,
transactions, or occurrences that gave rise to the action, and the nature of that knowledge or information; (5) the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of all persons who have given statements, and the
custodian of the copies of those statements; (6) the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of each person whom the disclosing party expects to call as an opinion witness at trial, the subject matter, conclusions, and opinions of the opinion witness and the bases therefore,
the qualifications of the opinion witness, and copies of any reports
prepared by the opinion witness; (7) a computation and measure of
damages alleged by the disclosing party, and the basis for the computation; (8) the exist.ence, location, custodian, and general description
of any tangible evidence or documents to be used at. trial and relevant insurance agreements; (9) a list of the documents that are
known by a party to exist, whether or not in the party's possession,
custody, or control and that that party believes may be relevant to
the subject matter of the action, and those which appear reasonably
279
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. A copy of
280
each document listed shall be served with the disclosure. Rule
222(c) imposes a continuing duty "seasonably supplement or amend
disclosures whenever new or different information or documents become known to the disclosing party."
Intertwined with these automatic disclosures .a re the strict limits
on the traditional discovery procedures codified in Illinois Rule 222.
In each case valued at $50,000 or less, the number of interrogatories
281
may not exceed thirty. No discovery deposition may exceed three
•

277. ILL. S. CT. R.
278. ILL. S. CT. R.
279. I d.
280. ILL. S. CT. R.
281. ILL. S. CT. R.

222(b).
222(c).
222(d)(l)-(9).
222(0(1).

•
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262

hours without agreement of the parties. Discovery depositions may
be taken only of parties and treating physicians and opinion wit283
nesses identified as testifying at trial. No evidence depositions are
permitted except where a trial witness is likely to be unavailable or
284
where "exceptional circumstances exist." Under Rule 222, the parties must disclose the identity of trial witnesses and of trial docu285
ments or tangible evidence. Under the prior rules, these were beyond the scope of discovery. The disclosure requirements are enforced
286
under a "disclose it or lose it" philosophy; non-complying evidence
is to be excluded at trial. In addition to this remedy, a trial court may
287
impose "any other sanction." Whether such judicial action is
enough to force a party to disclose unfavorable evidence will be tested
by actual practice.
4.

Colorado

Colorado was the second state in the country to adopt the Fed288
eral Rules as its own state rules in 1941. Over the intervening period, Colorado has generally followed the changes introduced in the
289
federal rules. Completing a process initiated in 1992, the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted revised discovery rules with the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure. (the "Colorado Rules"), effective January 1,
1995. The most dramatic change in the Colorado Rules was the addition of a new disclosure system, patterned largely after the 1993
Amendments to Federal Rule 26. Differences between the state and
federal rules are to accommodate the state disclosure/discovery requirements in the new case/trial management system set forth in
29
Colorado Rule 16. ° Colorado, however, applies different rules in different types of cases; domestic relations, juvenile and other proceedings have their own sets of rules. 291 Moreover, in 2000, Rule 26.3 was
adopted, providing special procedures for disclosure, alternate dis282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

ILL. S. CT. R. 222(0(2).
ILL. S. CT. R. 222 (f)(2)(a)-(b).
ILL. S. CT. R. 222(0(3).

See ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d).

ILL. S. CT. R. 222(g).
Id.
288. Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1384.
289. Duran v. Lamm, 70 P.2d 609, 613 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that construc-

tion of the Federal Rules by federal courts has always been considered as pers\].asive
authority by Colorado courts interpreting the state rules); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 26
comm. cmt. (~Revised ColoR. Civ. P. 26 is patterned largely after Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, as
amended ....").
290. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26 & comm. cmt.
291. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure (Domestic Relations)); COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.2 (Case Management (Domestic Relations)).
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pute resolution, and discovery and trial procedures for · "civil actions
in which the claimant seeks monetary damages not exceeding
292
$50,000." In another ·exception, special "Simplified Rules" for cases
involving less than $100,000 were implemented in 2000 in two coun..
ties as an experiment designed to promote quick and economical disposition of such claims.
Mandatory disclosure and explicit limits on traditional discovery
are the central themes of the 1995 amendments to the Colorado
Rules. The triggering mechanism for disclosure is the date when a
case is "at issue," defined as when "all parties have been served[,] all
293
pleadings permitted filed, or when the court directs." Once a case is
at issue the lawyers must confer within fifteen days, transmit all
mandatory disclosure within thirty days, and submit a proposed case
294
management order within forty-five days. Once a case management
order is entered, it controls the subsequent course of the pretrial
295
process until a trial management order is entered. The Colorado
Rules also require counsel to "certify that they have advised their cli296
ents of the estimated costs and fees" of conducting discovery. Clients are thus presumably better-informed consumers of the legal services they are purchasing and may better calculate the costs and
benefits of litigating the claim.
The disclosure required, without formal request, includes the
identity of every individual "likely to have discoverable information,"
a list of all relevant documents, a computation of damages and any
297
relevant insurance agreements. In the case management order, if
documents have not been ~ttached, parties are required to provide
298
dates when the disclosures will be made. The parties must also establish a date for identifying witnesses and exhibits to be introduced
at trial that have not been disclosed and a discovery schedule includ299
ing the timing and number of paper discovery to be used.
The 1995 revisions to the Colorado Rules also implemented strict
numerical limitations on the quantity of discovery. "A party may take
300
one deposition of each adverse party and of two other persons;" in301
terrogatories may not exceed thirty; requests for production and

292. COLO.
293. COLO.
294. ld.
295. COLO.
296. COLO.
297. COLO.
298. COLO.
299. COLO.

R. CIV. P. 26.3 (Limited Monetary Claim Actions).
R. CIV. P. 16(b).

R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3).
R. Crv. P. 16(b)(l)(IV).
R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l), 16(b); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(l)(lll).
R. CIV. P. 16(b)(l)(II).
R. Crv. P. 16(b)(l)(III)-(IV).
300. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(A).
301. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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requests for admissions are both limited to twenty. Pattern inter303
rogatories were adopted and encouraged. Subparts of non-pattern
interrogatories count as separate interrogatories for purposes of calculating numerical limits, whereas subparts in pattern interrogato304
ries are not counted. Colorado Rule 37, the sanctions provision, was
amen.d ed to include the disclosure procedures as well as the discovery
305
process. Failure to provide disclosure bars presentation of undisclosed evidence at trial or on a summary judgment motion "unless
306
such failure is harmless." . The court may impose reasonable ex307
penses and attorney's fees for such failure as well.
Effective July 1, 2000, in cases "in which the claimant seeks
monetary damages not exceeding $50,000," new procedures are implemented in all Colorado District Courts for "Limited Monetary
308
Claim ..Actions." In such cases, ''the disclosure rules of Colorado
Rule 26(A)" apply except: the parties make disclosures ."no later than
21 days after the case. is at issue[; in] personal injury cases, the plaintiff [must] disclose all healthcare providers and employers for the
past ten years and the defendant [must] disclose the present claim
309
case file [and] . . . any evidence supporting affirmative defenses."
The parties must attend a non-binding alternate dispute resolution
meeting within 120 days of the date the case is at issue and may
310
agree to a binding .form of ADR. Prior to the ADR, the only deposi311
tion a party may take is. th.a t of the adverse party and the
deposition of an expert may be used at trial without a showing of un312
availability.
a.

Simplified Procedure Rules

The Colorado Supreme Court recently adopted Simplified Procedure Rules (the "Colorado Simplified Rules") for a pilot project in two
313
Colorado counties for cases filed after March of 2000. The experiment is expected to last from eighteen to twenty-four months and is
302. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(D) (limiting production); COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(E)
(limiting admissions).
303. COLO. R. Crv. P. 33(e).
304. ld.
305. COLO. R. Crv. P. 37(a); COLO. R. Crv. P. 37(a)(2)(A).
306. COLO. R. Crv. P. 37(c)(l).
307. ld.
308. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26.3.
309. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.3(c).
310. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26.3(d)(e).
311. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26.3(d)(l)(A).
312. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.3(g).
313. Because the Colorado Rules of Simplified Procedure are part of a pilot program, they are as of yet unpublished. They can be obtained from the Colorado Office of
the State Court Administrator. A copy is on file with the author.
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designed to test the effectiveness of a pared down pretrial process.
These new Colorado rules carry the logic of prior changes in pretrial
314
procedure in Colorado and other states several steps further. They
separate classes of cases by the amount of recovery sought (the Sim·
plified Rules are used if less than $100,000 is sought) and substitute
a limited mandatory disclosure regime for almost all discovery rights
of the parties. In return, those choosing to use the new pretrial system are given early trial settings and speedy trials. The Colorado
Simplified Rules are premised on a diagnosis of current ills in the
civil justice system, such as its failure to distinguish between major,
complicated disputes and .those that might be tried effectively with
little or no pretrial discovery, its high costs, and its slow processing of
cases. Together these faults rob civil litigants of an opportunity for a
315
')ust, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
As the name implies, the goal of the "simplified procedure" is to
dramatically reduce the flow of paper between the parties, the meetings required to create case and trial management orders under
Colorado Rule 16, and the time and expense of pretrial litigation.
Almost all of the by-now traditional discovery devices of the Colorado
Rules (and the rules of all other states, plus the Federal Rules) including depositions, interrogatories, requests for production of docu316
ments and requests for admission, are barred. In place of the standard discovery devices, the simplified rules retain the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a)(l), which require disclosure of witnesses or persons likely to have discoverable information; relevant
documents, data compilation and tangible things; a computation of
damages claimed; and insurance policies concerning "disputed facts
317
alleged with particularity in the pleading." Such disclosures must
318
be completed within thirty days after the case is at issue. Additional exchange of information, in addition to normal disclosure requirements included under Colorado Rule 26(a)(l), is also required.
Thus, for example, in tort actions seeking damages, plaintiffs must
disclose medical information and sign waivers allowing defendants to
319
obtain the medical records. For employment cases, plaintiffs must
•

•

314. See generally Richard P. Holme, Just, Speedy and Inexpensive: Possible Simplified Procedure for Cases Under $100,000, 29 COLO. LAW. 5 (2000).
315. COLO. R. CIV. P. l(a).
316. It should be noted that aside from the provisions that are made inapplicable,
i.e., Rules 16, 26-34 and 36, all of the remaining standard Colorado Civil Procedure
Rules continue to apply. Thus, pleading requirements, Rule 12 motions, third-party
practice, and other rules regarding pretrial practice, trial, and post-trial matters are
unchanged. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c).
317. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l); COLOR. CIV. P. 26(a).
318. Id.
319. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(l)(B)(I).
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provide prior employment history documentation, demonstrate efforts to find work since the unfavorable employment action, and sign
320
waivers allowing access to their prior personnel files. The defen321
dant in such an action must produce the plaintiffs personnel file.
Colorado Simplified Rule l.l(c)(l)(B)(iii) also allows either party to
designate additional specific information and documentation that the
party believes should be disclosed. Such demands must be made in
writing, and a refusal by the opponent to provide the requested information or a response thereto may be subject to a motion for disclo322
sure or sanctions under Colorado Simplified Rule 37.
Although a large number of normal discovery devices are discarded by the Colorado Simplified Rules, some are retained. Existing
provisions of Colorado Rule 26 that remain in effect include the form
323
324
325
and filing of disclosures, claims of privilege, protective orders
326
and supplementation of disclosures. Requests for document production are permitted, but only for the purpose of inspecting documents
and other eVidentiary materials disclosed under the mandatory dis327
closure requirements.
The Colorado Simplified Rules also alter practice with respect to
328
depositions. Because recovery is capped at $100,000 for cases under
these rules, the use of expert witnesses is not likely to be frequent.
The provisions of Colorado Rule 26(a)(2.)(A) and (B) requiring written
disclosures for expert witnesses are retained, however, and Colorado
Simplified Rule l.l(c)(4) allows depositions of expert witnesses to be
used at trial. The parties would thus have to conduct their examina~
tions of the expert deponent as if it were at the trial; no second appearance would occur. This undoubtedly decreases the cost for expert
fees, but increases the risks and stakes of the deposition. Once such a
deposition is taken, any party may introduce it into evidence even
though the noticing party may have changed its mind and decided it
did not want to introduce the expert's testimony.
320. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l)(B)(II).
321. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l).
322. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l)(B)(iii). The Colorado rules provide a variety of
remedies for improperly withholding information in pretrial procedures.: precluding
evidence at trial that was not disclosed; requiring payment of expenses, including attorneys fees caused by the failure to disclose; judicially designating facts as being established for purposes of the litigation; striking all or parts of the resisting party's
pleadings; and even entering default judgment for failure to comply with pretrial obligations. COLO. R. CIV. P. 37(c).
323. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(4).
324. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
325.

326.
327.
328.

"

COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
COLO. R .. CIV. P. 26(e).
COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(B); COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l)(B).
COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED .P. l.l(c)(2).
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The only othe.r depositions allowed are those taken in the event a
329
party knows that a necessary witness will be unavailable at trial.
Even if the witness is later available, the deposition must still be introduced.330 Depositions for the sake of obtaining documents from
third parties are still available, and these documents may still be
331
subpoenaed under Colorado Simplified Rule 45.
.
The Colorado Simplifi~d Rules make important changes in other
ways. They require an exchange of a "detailed statement of the expected testimony" for each witness the party intends to call at trial if
332
that party's deposition has not been taken. Surprise. testimony is
ruled out; testimony by a witness that is outside the scope of the
333
matter disclosed in this written disclosure .is to be excluded. These
detailed statements regarding plaintiff's witnesses are equivalent to
the information exchanged regarding experts and are due at least
ninety days before trial; the corresponding disclosure of testimony of
witnesses for the defendant is due sixty days before trial and the dis334
closure for rebuttal witnesses, forty-five days before trial. If a party
were to call an adverse party or hostile witness, the only limitation
on the scope of such testimony would be a limitation to those m~tters
335
that had been previously disclosed. If there had been no agreement
regarding the authenticity of exhibits., witnesses could be presente.d
336
on that narrow issue alone. It should also be noted that any voluntary discovery agreed to by all parties
is
permitted
under
the
Simpli•
337
fied Rules.
·
The parties-, well in advance of the trial date, would then possess
all testimony of witnesses, whether lay or expert, documents, and
other materials and could then be expected to make an informed assessment of their own and their opponent's claims in time to avoid
last.. minute settlement negotiations "on the courthouse steps." Trial
exhibits are to be identified and exchanged thirty days before trial,
and the authenticity· of such documents is unquestioned unless writ338
ten objection is filed twenty days before trial.
The Colorado Simplified Rules provide a choice for litigants. Dis·
covery rights· are exchanged for speed and limitations on discovery
expense. The new rules represent a sharp departure from prior Colo.

.

•

•

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(4).

ld.
COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(5).
COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(3).
COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(7).
COLO.

R.

SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(3).

COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(7).

Id.
COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(9).
COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(6).
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rado· civil procedure which has long modeled itself closely with the
339
Federal Rules. In effect the procedure normally used in state
340
criminal prosecutions is applied to selected civil cases. To avoid
disadvantaging parties in the counties in which they are applied,
parties may simply opt out of the Colorado Simplified Rules and elect
341
to have their cases proceed under the normal Colorado Rules.
VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Summary judgment provides the opportunity to terminate litigation without trial. Summary judgment rules use the fruits of discovery and the provisions of relevant affidavits as the basis for a pretrial
disposition of the case. Judgment may be granted if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show no genuine issue as to material fact
342
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A final
determination without the opportunity for meaningful discovery,
however, undermines many aspects of our current pretrial system. It
is patently unfair to grant judgment without affording the losing
party the opportunity to gather and submit evidence on his or her
behalf. Fair and .a ccurate disposition of cases still remains dependent
upon information gathering by parties.
At the federal level, the relationship between the progress of discovery and a trial court's consideration of summary judgment motions was stressed by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett.343 The Court found that "[a]ny potential problem with such premature motions can adequately be dealt with under Rule 56(f), which
allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on
the motion to be continued, if the non-·moving party h,a s not had an
344
opportunity to make full discovery." There is a clear link between
pretrial dispositive motions and the status of discovery. The Chief
Justice has noted that parties must have an opportunity for "full dis·
covery" before a court may enter judgment. 345 The Supreme Court in
346
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. again emphasized that summary
judgment must not be granted prematurely. Although that case emphasized that the non-movant must come forward with specific facts
339. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
340. See Holme, supra note 314, at 8.
341. COLO. R. CIV. P. l.l(a)(2)(b).
342. See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510(c); KAN. CODE CIV. P. § 60256.
343.

477

u.s. 317 (1986).

344. Id. at 326.
345. Id.
346. 477 u.s. 242, 251 (1986).
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that demonstrate the existence of an issue for trial, the Court noted
that this was "qualified by Rule 56(f)'s provision that summary
judgment be refused where the non-moving party has not had the
opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."347
•
It is difficult to determine whether the use of summary judgment
in the state courts has increased since the onset of limits on discovery. Reported appellate decisions are clearly an inexact measure. The
vast majority of cases ended by motion practice at the trial court
level are never appealed, and thus rarely appear in published opinions. Reading reported state appellate cases over a considerable period of time leaves me with the impression that many more cases and
issues are now decided without trial than before. I candidly admit no
statistical proof of this observation is available at the moment with
respect to the state courts.
At the federal level, attempts have been made to document the
premise that proportionately fewer cases are tried in the district
courts than a generation ago, and that summary dispositions, espe348
cially by Federal Rule 56, of cases has increased. The percentage of
civil cases proceeding to trial in the federal courts plunged from 8.5%
349
of all pending civil cases in 1973 to just 2.3% in 1999. This is particularly noteworthy because summary judgment is typically a
350
weapon for defendants and the district courts are now highly recep351
tive to such motions. An analysis of all published federal court decisions in the first quarter of 1988 concluded "summary judgments
were awarded to defendants in whole or in part in ninety-eight cases
352
and denied in only twenty-four." Summary judgment and other pre347. Id. at 250 n.4.
348. See, e.g., Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ.
L. REV. 141 (2000). The author reviewed twenty volumes of the Federal Reporter during 1973 and during 1997 to 1998 and reported a marked increase in summary dispositions of civil cases. Id. at 143. He found that "(i]n the later sample, Rule 56 decisions
predominate the reported civil cases and Rule 56 is used far more integrally to resolve
claims." Id. at 165.
349. Id. at 140.
350. Judge Morton Denlow, Summary Judgment: Boon or Burden, 37 JUDGE'S J.,
Summer 1998, at 26 (federal magistrate jtidge posits that summary judgment provides
defendants with several tactical advantages: it forces plaintiff to present her case before trial, to incur substantial additional expense, and to delay resolution or settlement of the case).
351. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1938
(1998) (D.C. Circuit Judge decries "unseemly rush to summary judgment"); see also,
Mollica, supra note 348, at 87-94 (surveying post-Celotex decisions in the lower federal
courts and concluding summary judgment by federal district judges is no longer rare
or uncommon).
352. Professors Issacharoff and Loewenstein surveyed 140 contested summary
judgment motions. Samuel Issacharoff and George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
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tr~al

dispositive motions tend to favor repeat players and more affiu~
ent parties largely employers, corporations, insurers, etc typically
353
defendants. Professor Risinger stresses this point:
[L]ook at the practical position of plaintiffs. Something close to a
one page form motion by defendant can throw on the plaintiff the
responsibility to dredge, structure, collate and cross-reference all
materials in the file to make them available to the judge before
trial. Because the material must be reduced to a coherently structured written form, this task can sometimes take as long or longer
354
than actually trying the· case.
·

As Professor
Thornburg
has
pointed
out
''[d]iscovery
in
particu·
.
lar is an area in which decisions about the scope of discovery and the
process for undertaking it create predictable advantages and disad355
vantages for predictable types of litigants." Limits on information
gathering, together with increased use of summary judgment, pro·
vide defendants with major tactical advantages. First, a plaintiff is
forced to engage in a paper mini-trial, just to ensure that her case
goes forward. Repeat player-defendants typically have the resources
356
to make motions that plaintiffs attorneys do not.' Second, summary
judgment motions allow defendants to view the critical elements of
plaintiff's claim in advance of trial. Even is such a motion is lost, defendant may still prevail at trial; a losing plaintiff has no such "second chance." Third, such motions may force plaintiff to complete dis.covery at unfavorable or inopportune times, in order to ensure plaintiff has put her best case forward. Fourth, very often defendants will
not commence settlement negotiations until the plaintiff has survived a motion for summary judgment. As a result, cases are often
delayed, and delay typically favors defendants.
It is true that often changes in state pretrial practice provide for
mandatory disclosure of information by both sides as well as limits
on discovery. But many of the state disclosure rules apply to a restricted base of information, i.e., "disputed facts pleaded with parAbout Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 92 (1990). Of these, 122 were made by
defendants and only 18 by plaintiffs. ld. They concluded that "courts are encouraging
the filing of summary judgment motions." I d.
353. ld. See generally Denlow, supra note 350.
354. D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter·Revolution: A Summary
Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35, 41 (1988).
3'55. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the ((Haves" a Little More: Considering the
1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 S. M. U. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998).
356. The use of summary judgment on behalf of defendants in employment discrimination and civil rights cases has often been noted. See, e.g., Mark S. Dichter and
Debra L. Casey, Practicing Law lnst., Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases:
1995 at 1 (1995); RICHARDT. SEYMOUR, ALI-ABA, ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
LITIG. 169 (1993).
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ticularity in the pleadings." Under such rules, plaintiffs will be provided information only in areas in which they are able to allege specific facts before discovery. For most plaintiffs, this may not be much
help. The restrictive scope of disclosure, combined with the limited
availability of traditional discovery mechanisms may thus operate in
tandem to disadvantage them. Initial disclosure rules may also be a
back door to more intensively fact-dominated pleadings, where law·
suits can only be brought by those with pre-suit ability to marshal
important facts. 358
.
357

VII. INFORMATION SHARING IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

As described earlier, a number of states have revised their pretrial rules to mandate information sharing, restrict discovery be359
tween p~arties, and legislate civility in the pretrial process. The
process is to be less adversarial, less costly, and less time consuming;
information is to be available to parties sooner and exchanged with
less formality than at present. Trial judges are urged to use sanc360
tions and address abuses in a "strong and forthright fashion." In
effect, the changes seek to limit an attorney's use of adversarial skills
to trial, i.e., arguing the implications and consequences of facts already revealed. While disclosure of information is generally not con361
clusive it "may be contradicted by other evidence" or even inadmissible at trial providing information to an opponent is substantively and psychologically difficult in our system.
Arizona, 362 Illinois,363 and other states364 require a voluntary disclosure of information by parties to their opponents. The Arizona
rules are the broadest .a nd may well be the harbinger of future ·devel357. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise directed by the court, a party
shall, Without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: (a) the
name, the address ... of each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings ...
(b) a listing, together with a copy of ... all documents, data compilations,
and tangible things relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleadings.
ld. Contra ARz. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (which contains no such limitation to "facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings" regarding disclosure, witnesses, documents and
other information).
358. See, e.g., Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV.
809, 812-13 (1998).
359. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
360. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1 ct. cmt. to 1991 amendment.
361. See, e.g., ILL. S. -CT. R. 20l(j).
362. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a).
363. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d) (imposing mandatory disclosure requirements and strict
limits on discovery in actions seeking money damages not in excess of $50,000).
364. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.1.
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opments. Arizona Rule 26.1(a) provides that all parties are to disclose
voluntarily all information necessary to process the case.. Included
are nine specific items: (1) "[t]he factual basis of each claim or defense";365 (2) "[t]he legal theor[ies] upon which each claim or defense
366
is based;" (3) information concerning each witness., along "with a
367
fair description of the substance of ... expected testimony;" ( 4) information concerning other persons who may have knowledge and
368
the nature of that knowledge; (5) information concerning persons
369
who have provided statements; (6) information concerning expert
witnesses, including the content of their testimony and their qualifications;370 (7) "a computation and measure of damage[s] ...";37i (8)
''[t]he existence ... of any tangible evidence or relevant documents"
872
intended to be used as exhibits and production thereof; and (9) a
373
list of other documents that may be relevant.
374
The initial· disclosure is to be made "as fully as then possible"
and must include all information then "in the possession, custody, or
contror' of the party, as well as information that can be "ascertained,
375
learned or acquired by reasonable inquiry and investigation." The
parties are re·q uired to disclose information relevant not only to their
claim or defense but to the opponents' contentions as well. This duty
to disclose is ongoing, and parties must supplement their disclosures
376
377
seasonably. The parties are admonished to facilitate discovery.
Arizona Justice Zlaket has written:
(A]t the outset of a case the parties must make a full, mutual and
simultaneous disclosure of all relevant infortnation known by or
available to them and their lawyers. In other words, no more "hide
the pea." No longer will it be advantageous to play games of semantics ("If he'd have just asked the right question ..."). Hopefully,
Rule 26.1 will eliminate the need for extensive discovery in most
378
cases ....

The goal is to achieve less expensive, faster and more equitable liti-

ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a)(l).

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l(b)(l).

375.

ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(b)(3).

ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(2).
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(3).
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(4).

ARiz. R. CIV. P. ,2 6.l(a)(5).
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(6).
ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(a)(7).
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(8).
ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a)(9).

376. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(b)(2).

I d.
378. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 5.
377~
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gation results.
·
But can rule changes and exhortations from appellate judges
bring about these results? I am dubious for a number of reasons.
First, there is considerable dispute regarding the proposition that it
is discovery that is the "problem" in civil c.as·es. As discussed earlier,379 empirical data from studies of federal and state cases do not
confirm the "discovery abuse" hypothesis. Nor is there compelling
evidence that mandatory disclosure and concomitant restrictions on
traditional discovery will bring about quicker and less expensive
resolution of cases. The only large-scale study of which I am aware,
that of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice in the federal courts, did
not "support strongly the policy of mandatory early disclosure as a
means of significantly reducing lawyer work hours and thereby reducing the costs of litigation, or as a means of reducing time to disposition."380 A survey of 1000 lawyers by the ABA's Litigation Section
likewise "provided no evidence that . . . disclosure had reduced discovery costs or delays" or that it decreased conflict between adversar381
ies in the discovery process. Indeed, by moving the time and cost of
information gathering to an earlier phase, these changes may actually impede settlement. The resources already expended may deter
382
parties from compromising laterj> Moreover, while many agree that
the resolution of civil cases in state courts is far too slow, the causes
may well lie elsewhere: the number and priority of criminal cases in
state judicial systems, and the lack of judges and infrastructurecourtrooms, personnel, etc. to promptly handle cases.
Second, an even deeper problem may be the nature of our judicial process. A system that promotes adversarial resolution of cases
through the efforts of client-dedicated legal representatives cannot be
expected to readily accommodate procedures that quickly and efficiently provide information to the opponent. The roots of this are in
the perception that the rules of professional conduct mandate aggressive resistance to the opponent's interests. 383 A lawyer "should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf' according to the official comment to Rule 1.3 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional

379. See discussion supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
380. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the
Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 678 (1998); Willging et
at, supra note 93, at 525.
381. Kahalik, supra note 380, at 679 (quoting Kathleen L. Blaner et al., ABA, Man·
datory Disclosure Survey: Federal Rule 26(A)(l) After One Year (1996)).
382. See, e.g., Carol Campbell Cure, Practical Issues Concerning Arizona's New
Rules of Civil Procedure: A Defense -Perspective, 25 Az. ST. L. J. 55, 62 (1992).
383. See discussion infra notes 385-96 and accompanying text.
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384

'

Conduct (the "Model Rules").
The pretrial process is not an exception to this system, but is
385
viewed as an integral part of the process, a collection of weapons to
be used to help control the outcome of the dispute and promote the
interest of one's own clients. The lawyer ''may take whatever lawful
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor."386 The Supreme Court has even recognized that a lawyer's
job is not necessarily to secure the truth and that, "[w ]ithin the limits
of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not
387
only are his right but may be his duty." Attempts to increase voluntary cooperation and "limit the adversarial nature of the proceedings"388 are understood to compromise the advocate's duty to "zealously assert[ ] the client's position" and to jeopardize the client's interests.389 Rules requiring, for example, disclosure of witnesses who
the party ''believes" have relevant knowledge appear to be an incursion into the mental processes of the attorney and client in violation
390
of the "work product" doctrine. Given this cultural context, are attorneys more likely to behave differently with respect to required disclosures than in responding to traditional interrogatories or other
discovery demands?
The ABA Section of Litigation Special Task Force on Ethics in391
terviewed a variety of lawyers and trial judges in two citieS. A fair
conclusion from its data is that "the basic, overriding, dominant norm
of the legal _profession, especially among litigators, is the norm of
392
zealous advocacy of client's interests." In this context, lawyers consider it legitimate to use tactics to throw opponents off balance and
raise costs to the other side, so long as there is some arguably legitimate purpose is served. Each request for information is treated as

384. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1998).
385. Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 714-16.
386. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1999). Many lawyers understand this to permit any conduct on the client's behalf that is not explicitly prohibited.
The comparable provision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7,
stated: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Although the Model Rules ate
less explicit, its advocacy and confidentiality provisions seem similar to the Code.
387. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (citations omitted).
388. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1 cmt.
389. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1998).
390. If the materials sought contain "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney'' opinion work product, the materials are deserving of sp ecial protection. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 28, § 26. 64.
391. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large Firm Litigators:
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998).
392. ld. at 733.
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narrowly as possible, every claim of privilege or irrelevance is as393
serted as broadly as possible.
The general principle guiding discovery requests for documents is
that defense counsel may not flatly lie or hide documents, but they
.are entitled to be "aggressive," making the plaintiff's lawyer "work
for what he wants," and withhold from relieving the plaintiffs law394
yer of the burden of preparing his own case.

In this culture, counsel seek to use the pretrial process to maximize
information gathering and admissions from the opponent, while at
the same time resisting the information obtained by, or given to, the
395
adversary. "Where the object always is to beat every plowshare into
a sword, the ·discovery procedure is. employed variously as weaponry."sgs
Third, lawyers typically view their obligations and behavior in
the context of specific cases. A client in a weak position in terms of
the law and facts, or one determined to deter future litigation and resist disclosures that might har1n it in later lawsuits, is more likely to
be obstructive and determined to raise costs for the other side than a
client willing~to settle a matter or one that appraises its legal and
397
factual position differently. These particular factors may well outweigh general rules mandating information sharing.
Fourth, lawyers are, of necessity, also intensely practical. Many
see rules requiring cooperation and disclosure as a threat to business
interests. They believe clients prefer attorneys who use rules and
procedures to the client's advantage and fear potential cli~nts will be
398
reluctant to hire a lawyer who is viewed as "cooperative." When
their interests are disadvantaged, clients may choose not to believe
that this was the result of neutrally applied rules, but rather of the
lawyer's lack of zeal. Concern about income and business has been
reinforced by the increasing competition among firms for clients and
among lawyers within firms who provide rewards based upon attract399
ing clients. The contingent fee lawyer has a strong incentive to construe strictly what is considere·d "relevant" because the lawyer's fi•

•

393. Gordon, supra note 391, at 712-13.
394. ld. at 712.
.
395. .See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, In Defense o{Discouery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV.
263, 264 (1992) (concluding that discovery can be used to impose costs on opponents
and avoid decision); Wolfson, supra note 95, at 18-19 (stating that discovery "gives impetus and opportunity to the baser litigational instincts of delay, deception, and unbridled confro~tational advocacy").
396. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980).
397. Gordon, supra note 391, at. 714.
398. P .N. Harkins III, Sanctions for Failure to Disclose, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 161, 162
(1992).
399. Gordon, supra note 391, at 717, 730-731.
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nancial interest are at stake in addition to the client's. Attorneys on
hourly retainer agreements may view protracted pretrial conflict as
profit enh~ncing. Although some ,c lients oversee discovery to assess
costs, many do not.
Fifth, lawyers are also trained to be skeptical; they fe,a r that an
opponent's failure to disclose will not be uncovered, perhaps due to
400
limitations on traditional discovery methods. Deposition time lim401
its, for example, may provide incentives to parties and their attorneys to use all available means to withhold relevant information,
hoping it will not be reached within the time allowed by the rules to
take depositions. Such actions are often claimed to be justified by the
belief that opponents are taking illegitimate advantage of the discovery process and not playing fairly by the rules.
In this climate, rules are not likely to be complied with unless
they are vigorously enforced. However, most trial judges intensely
dislike getting involved in such disputes. Gordon contends that
"[d]iscovery disputes are a nuisance .... [l]f a lawyer seeking to
compel seeks sanctions, there is a litigation within the litigation,
cross~motions for sanctions .... [l]f we award sanctions, we are say402
ing, lets keep this pettifogging game going.
The failure of federal judges, for example, to sanction attorneys
,a nd parties for violation of discovery rules has been widely discussed.403 Only the most egregious violations seem to result in effec404
tive s'a nctions. "The whole system of Civil adjudication would be
ground to a virtual halt if the courts were forced to intervene in even
405
a.modest percentage of dis~overy transactions."
Some argue that the changes in discovery rules in Arizona, Illinois, Colorado, and other states have now created an ethical duty on
•

400. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a) (limiting interrogatories to forty); ARIZ. R. CIV.
P. 34(b) (limiting parties to one request for production not to include more than 10 distinct items or categories of items); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (limiting depositions to four
hours in length).
401. See e·.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 3,0(d) (imposing a four hour limitation); ILL. SUPER.
CT. R. 206(d) (imposing a three hour limitation).
402. Gordon, supra note 391, at 722.
403. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Ethical Perspectives on Discovery Reform, 3 REv.
LITIG. 51, 62-67 (1982) (describing the lack of sanctions for discovery abuse under
Rules 11, 26(c), & 37; Frank F. Flegal, ,Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects and Reform, 3
REV. LITIG. 1 (1983) at 15, 17-19, 24-25 (same); Wolfson, supra note 95, at 4 7-48
(same).
404. See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 81, at 217-218 (explaining that severe sanctions
are only used in the most extreme cases); see also MAss. CONTINUING LEGAL Enuc.,
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS 145-46 (1992) (providing a survey of judges of the
District Massachusetts indicating that discovery sanctions are, rarely imposed except
in the most egregious cases).
405. In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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the part of attorneys to the court to seek a full presentation of the
facts, and that this trumps the attorney's duty of zealous representa406
tion of the client's interest. Civil counsel no longer can wait until
opposing counsel asks for discovery; disclosure rules are the substi..
tute for such requests. If an attorney fails to make the voluntary disclosures affirmatively required, the attorney . has unlawfully obstructed access or unlawfully concealed a document within the proscription of Rule 3.4(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct which provides that "[a] lawyer shall no.t: (a) unlawfully obstruct
407
another party's access to evidence.'' Prior discovery provisions imposed no direct obligation on counsel to ensure that all discoverable
information was transmitted to the opposing party; that was the
function of the other side's skill and diligence in asking. Mandatory
disclosure alters this balance, and some new ~les are unequivocal in
requiring counsel and the parties to turn over information, even
when contrary to their own interests.
The contention is that new rules create for attorneys in private
civil cases duties and status akin to that of the criminal prosecutor in
408
409
criminal matters. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held
that the "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
410
or bad faith of the prosecution." The mandate of Brady "requires
disclosure only of evidence that is both favorable to the defendant
411
and 'material either to guilt or to punishment."' Not only exculpa. .
tory, but mitigating evidence as well as evidence that relates to the
credibility and reliability of a material government witness fall
412
within this doctrine. In addition, Brady similarly requires the
•

406. See, e.g., Colin Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation and The Ethics of Mandatory Disclosure: Moving Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1993).
407. The alleged "unlawfulness" is the violation of the disclosure requirement. Rule
3.4(d) likewise imposes a duty of fairness to opposing party and counsel. Since lawyers
are also under a duty to comply with prevailing rules of procedure, Rule 3.4(d) might
also be said to be a specific application of Rule 3.4(c), Obedience to Rules of a Tribunal.
408. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTIGE, THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3·3.11.
409. 373 U.S. 83 (1963), modified by United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
410. Id. at 87.
411. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985}; see also United States v.
Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188,
1198 (9th Cir. 1995).
412. Spicer v. Roxbury Correctional Inst. 194 F.3d 547, 556 (4th Cir. 1999)
("[I]mpeachment evidence is unequivocally subject t~o disclosure."); United States v.
Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (extending the Brady requirements to evidence drawing into doubt credibility of witness when witness' reliability may be determinative of guilt or innocence). The Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence which the defense can use to impeach a witness falls within the purview of
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prosecution to examine the files to ascertain if there is anything exculpatory in nature, and this duty cannot be delegated.413 The responsibility of a public prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.414
415
Most civil lawyers feel no comparable ob.ligation. The traditional discovery provisions in civil litigation were intended to create a
level playing field; each side had equal access to all relevant infortnation. Through interrogatories, depositions, and other information
gathering devices, each party had the opportunity to develop its case,
and fueled by the lawyer's duty to act with "reasonable diligence and
416
promptness in representing a client," truth would presumably
emerge in the courtroom. The discovery rules were essentially akin to
a referee in a prizefight; each party would do its best to win under
the rules prescribed, as determined by the neutral judge or jury. I
personally incline to an expansive inte~pretation of disclosure rules
but it remains to be seen whether such provisions truly alter the
shape of the American pretrial system, or whether they merely provide for more efficient dissemination of information that competent
counsel would have sought anyway.
VIII.CONCLUSION

The importance of pretrial processes in contemporary litigation
ensures that procedural rules impact both society as a whole and millions of individuals and business entities. State pro~edural rules governing pretrial information gathering are in flux. While many states
continue to follow the model of the Federal Rules, others are experimenting with innovations that follow quite different paths. These developments may be the harbinger of a future procedural regime,
changing the traditional roles of both attor11eys and judges in civil
litigation.

Brady. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 (1999); Kyles v. Whitely, 514
U.S. 419, 432-33 (1995); United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985); Giglio v .
.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112
(1976) ("[T]he proper standard ofmateriality must reflect [the] overriding concern with
the justice of the finding of gUilt.")
413. United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S.
1127 (1997) (holding that an individual prosecutor has duty to learn of favorable evidence in possession of others acting on government's behalO; United States v. Narciso,
446 F. Supp. 252, 271 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
414. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.1L
415. Gordon, supra note 391, at 710-18.
416. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1999).
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